How might constitution-makers write “transformative constitutions”? Scholars and policymakers have looked to constitutional design as a mechanism for societal change, for example, promoting democracy, equality, and social rights. In these efforts, accountability has most often been limited to government actors. Yet, constitution-makers are increasingly introducing the “horizontal” application of rights, a potent tool for transformation whereby private actors also gain constitutional rights obligations. We argue that a key predictive element in introducing this mechanism is a meeting of the minds in constitution-making processes, where interests and mutual commitments from a broad cross-section of society are expressed at the negotiating table. We test our theory, employing cross-national data concerning the adoption of horizontal application over time, and examples from specific countries’ experiences. Our findings support our theory, suggesting that powerful articulation of interests by expert professionals in inclusive processes is a significant factor in reshaping citizen duties and, thus, transforming society.

The involvement of private actors in global policymaking has received significant scholarly attention in IR. Existing accounts have shown how entities such as corporations, businesses, and philanthropies build their authority to become legitimate actors and shape global politics. This paper argues that contemporary global dynamics, such as the financialisation of development and the rise of multistakeholderism, have ushered in a trend where private actors are not only seen as legitimate delegated authorities but also embraced as fully fledged political equals indispensable for addressing societal problems. To understand this shift, it is necessary to move beyond an examination of legitimation strategies to interrogate, instead, how private actors shape what are seen as ‘apt’ or ‘deviant’ ways of knowing and acting upon problems. Through an examination of what I call ‘political normalisation’ in the field of global food governance, I show how through concrete practices – individualising social problems, defining institutional aptness, and cultivating the landscape – private actors not only cultivate a perception of themselves as rightful global governors but also shape the parameters of what rightful governing ought to be. More broadly, this shift invites us to further complicate the public–private divide and assess the novel ways through which private actors ‘do’ politics.

The disappearance of migrants, which has reached preoccupying high numbers in recent decades, is related both to the particular vulnerability of migrants traversing dangerous migratory routes and to the high degree of impunity that characterizes investigation and search efforts required. This article argues that the disappearance of migrants at the hands of non-state actors in contexts of systematic impunity and in situations where the state had knowledge or should have had knowledge of a serious risk of such disappearance, but failed to act to prevent it, can be considered to have occurred with the acquiescence of the state. Thus, given that all further elements of the definition of enforced disappearance have been satisfied, this factual situation qualifies as an “enforced disappearance” for the purposes of international human rights law. Key to this demonstration is the concept of knowledge, which is an essential component of acquiescence. This article not only addresses the normative framework of acquiescence and its interpretation by international and regional human rights bodies, including how it relies on the element of state knowledge, but it also examines the extent to which this factor is critical to understanding states’ due diligence obligations to prevent, investigate, and sanction human rights obligations, including disappearances. In order to better understand the factors that should be taken into consideration while assessing a state‘s knowledge of migrant disappearances, including in the context of systematic impunity, it is then suggested to borrow from the international criminal law test related to the concept of “constructive knowledge” and to the doctrine of command responsibility. These considerations should inform a test for assessing whether disappearances of migrants occurring in contexts of systematic impunity can be considered as having been known by the state and as having occurred with its acquiescence and, thus, as constituting “enforced disappearances” under international human rights law.

This article serves as an introduction to the special issue on ‘Populism and Right-Wing Legal Mobilization in Europe’. We point to the dependence of populists in power on non-state actors: populist governments have ideological and political reasons to need the support of civil society’s right-wing representatives and have the financial and institutional means to strengthen those organizations. We then map right-wing legal mobilization in Europe based on the analyses in the special issue. By right-wing legal mobilization, we understand the organized efforts, resources, and strategies employed by individuals, groups, or organizations with conservative or right-leaning ideologies to embody their values in positive law and its interpretation. The text concludes with a dynamic normative framework to assess this type of mobilization. Drawing on recent contributions from comparative constitutional law, human rights, and socio-legal studies, we argue that the analysis and evaluation of right-wing legal mobilization could be based on a comprehensive analysis of three bundles of issues: (1) the relationship between mobilizing actors and the courts, as well as the local standard of judicial independence, (2) the relation of right-wing argumentation to systemic linkages and historical trajectories of human rights, (3) the redistributive effect (economic and symbolic) and the potential success of such mobilization on the legal capacities of other actors who may have opposing interests. From this perspective, the problematic part of right-wing legal mobilization in the context of populism is, therefore, not its ideological, conservative character but its influence on the rule of law to gain strategic advantage. In the process, the very idea of the rule of law and the related issue of civic agency may be compromised.

This article analyses the law-making power of international sports federations, with a specific focus on their authority of shaping global norms on gender. It explores a variety of international sporting rules from feminist and queer perspectives. These include the ban of rainbow armbands at the 2022 FIFA (Men’s) World Cup, rules on the participation of transgender persons in rugby, gendered and racialized uniform regulations in sports, and the Semenya case concerning the sports participation of women with variations in sex characteristics The analysis asserts that despite being non-state actors, international sports federations are de facto international lawmakers that disseminate hegemonic gender norms reflecting cis-hetero-sexism and white body norms. However, analysing the Semenya case and the decision of the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the case shows that the law-making power of international sports federations in shaping gender norms is not absolute but embedded in a transnational network of norms. The article concludes that subjecting international sports federations to a feminist, queer, and anti-racist legal analysis assists in understanding how hegemonic norms on gender circulate transnationally and enhances knowledge on how international law works in practice.

The United States and United Kingdom have carried out a series of strikes upon Yemeni territory since January 2024. The acting States have justified these on the basis of the right of self-defence in response to the series of attacks that have been perpetrated by the Houthi group in Yemen against various commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea. On the face of it this was a relatively straightforward justification. Yet, when subjected to analysis it becomes evident that not only is the justification itself not clear, but that the law governing the actions—the jus ad bellum—is not sufficiently settled to provide clear parameters by which to assess the legality of the strikes. Furthermore, the strikes themselves, and the purposes for which they were undertaken, may have set a precedent with unforeseeable consequences.

Since its inception, the inter-state dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation has generally been praised for effectively protecting the rule of law in international trade relations. While the relatively recent dismantling of this system does not necessarily mean the end of the WTO nor of the binding nature of its rules, the current crisis may be a good opportunity to reconsider the role of the rule of law in international trade relations and the ways in which it could further be accommodated. One suggestion, occasionally raised in the past, would be strengthening the enforcement of WTO rules by opening it to private action, either before national courts or through international adjudication. After all, the latter has been widely available to foreign investors covered by thousands of international investment agreements in force for decades. This contribution recalls the reasons behind the current lack of private enforcement of WTO law and argues that developments in international trade relations and experiences with investor-state dispute settlement are likely to work against rather than in favor of its introduction in the foreseeable future. Increased transparency and institutionalisation of non-state actors’ role in trade enforcement is therefore recommended instead.

In international human rights law, the notion of due diligence concerns a qualifier of behaviour to realize human rights protection, including the protection against non-state actor interferences. However, the question remains what due diligence obligations of states in the context of non-state actor interferences exactly entail in international human rights law. The present article aims to address this matter by comparing case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with that of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). Using a working model of due diligence that has been introduced in recent scholarly work, this article further explores this model and attempts to give further meaning to its two paradigms: ‘regulation’ and ‘risk management’. In that way, it maps out the relevant elements of this foundational concept that lies at the heart of human rights protection.

As the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) continues to grow, policymakers are increasingly grappling with the question of how to regulate this technology. The most far-reaching international initiative is the European Union (EU) AI Act, which aims to establish the first comprehensive, binding framework for regulating AI. In this article, we offer the first systematic analysis of non-state actor preferences toward international regulation of AI, focusing on the case of the EU AI Act. Theoretically, we develop an argument about the regulatory preferences of business actors and other non-state actors under varying conditions of AI sector competitiveness. Empirically, we test these expectations using data from public consultations on European AI regulation. Our findings are threefold. First, all types of non-state actors express concerns about AI and support regulation in some form. Second, there are nonetheless significant differences across actor types, with business actors being less concerned about the downsides of AI and more in favor of lax regulation than other non-state actors. Third, these differences are more pronounced in countries with stronger commercial AI sectors. Our findings shed new light on non-state actor preferences toward AI regulation and point to challenges for policymakers balancing competing interests in society.