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2 results

  • Chapter 8 - Nature versus Nurture and Cognitive Ability Testing: Historical Sketches

  • Christopher Goodey, The Open University, Milton Keynes
  • Book:
    Development
    Published online:
    10 June 2021
    Print publication:
    10 June 2021, pp 186-204

  • Summary

    The previous themes reach into modern debates about freedom and necessity, which are still central in education and psychology today. Contributing to the rise of formal disciplines of developmental and child psychology, educational psychology, clinical psychology and cognitive psychology, as well as psychiatry, empirical approaches based on sense perception began in the mid-eighteenth century; but they are equally the outcome of broader religious and cultural influences. The book therefore concludes with an overview of the direct traces on the modern disciplines of the religious ideas discussed in earlier chapters: in Britain through David Hartley, Joseph Priestley and Francis Galton, and the nature-versus-nurture formula; and in France Hippolyte Taine, Alfred Binet (creator of the ‘mental age’ score, subsequently IQ measurement) and Jean Piaget himself.

  • Properties, laws, and worlds

  • Deborah C. Smith
  • Journal:
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 45 / Issue 4 / August 2015
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2020, pp. 471-489

  • Jonathan Schaffer argues against a necessary connection between properties and laws. He takes this to be a question of what possible worlds we ought to countenance in our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. In doing so, he unfairly rigs the game in favor of contingentism. I argue that the necessitarian can resist Schaffer’s conclusion while accepting his key premise that our best theories of modality, counterfactuals, etc. require a very wide range of things called ‘possible worlds’. However, the necessitarian can and should insist that, in many cases, these worlds are not metaphysically possible. I will further argue that, having taken such a stance, the necessitarian has additional resources to respond to Schaffer’s other arguments against the view.