This chapter argues that, even if emerging economies actively promote hybrid procedures and workouts and they create a simplified insolvency framework for micro- and small enterprises (MSEs), ordinary insolvency proceedings will still play a significant role in the economy. On the one hand, they will serve as the primary mechanism for the reallocation of assets of nonviable medium and large enterprises (MLEs). On the other hand, formal reorganization procedures can still be relevant for viable MLEs unable to complete a workout or hybrid procedure due to the lack of trust on the debtor’s management team or the need to use some provisions exclusively available in formal insolvency proceedings. Therefore, emerging economies should make sure to improve the efficiency of their ordinary insolvency proceedings. Nonetheless, they cannot adopt the type of complex procedure heavily supervised by courts existing in countries with strong institutional environments. Instead, they should design a procedure requiring a minimum involvement of courts. The chapter explains how this goal can be achieved while enhancing the attractiveness of ordinary insolvency proceeding for debtors and creditors.

This chapter examines the history of fracking as a new technology for enhancing the production of oil and gas, looking for explanations of why the practice is restricted or banned in some jurisdictions but permitted and fostered in others. The classic risk-perception paradigm, which emphasizes the role of public opinion, the mass media, and grass-roots activism, provides useful insight into how and why fracking was banned first in France and later in the UK. Risk perception provides less insight into why fracking is generally acceptable in some states of the US but not in others. Several contextual factors favoring fracking in the US are explored: private ownership of mineral rights and royalty policies, favorable state regulatory climates, a national interest in energy security, and vocal support of fracking from national political leaders of both parties. We look at fracking governance in Texas, North Dakota and Pennsylvania, where fracking technologies are treated as acceptable extensions of conventional technologies and where the practice is neither widely feared nor stigmatized. These states appreciate the benefits of employment and tax revenue fracking operations stimulate.

This chapter examines Article 6 1958 CSC and Articles 74(3) and 83(3) LOSC with a view towards ascertaining the extent to which these provisions set out a rule governing the conduct of unilateral activities in disputed EEZ and continental shelf areas. Article 6 1958 CSC, is the forerunner to the provision in the LOSC, is developed on the basis of equidistance: States are not entitled to extend their continental shelf beyond the equidistance boundary – that is, assuming there are no special circumstances. Articles 74(3)/83(3) LOSC lays down two obligations that are geared towards two different purposes: cooperation and abstention. The cooperative aspect is formed by the fact that States must seek provisional arrangements. The aspect of abstention is exemplified in that the States concerned must refrain from unilateral conduct that hampers or jeopardises EEZ/continental shelf delimitation. These two obligations arise conjointly in some, but not all, disputed EEZ/continental shelf areas. A dual function underlies the obligation not to hamper or jeopardise: first, it places limitations on the scope for coastal States to actively undertake unilateral acts; and, second, the obligation curtails the ways in which States can respond to activities undertaken in a disputed area.

The international legal framework that is applicable to disputed maritime areas consists of conventional law – predominantly found in the LOSC – and general rules of international law. Combined, these form a template of rules and obligations that must be observed by States in relation to their disputed area. Two questions arise in this regard: is the international law that is applicable in disputed maritime areas sufficiently defined? And does this international law actually contribute to prevent conflicts between claimant States, or between a third State, or its nationals, and a claimant States in respect of a disputed maritime area? Differences exist in terms of the amount of conflict that is engendered if one claimant decides to act on its rights in a disputed maritime area, without another coastal State’s prior approval. An important question is how does this aspect influence the issue of what the rights and obligations are of States in disputed maritime areas? Also, whether the scope for unilateralism can be defined conclusively is addressed. However, it becomes clear that determining this scope is made impossible by the variable of the circumstances surrounding a particular disputed maritime area.

Famous for concepts such as “identity crisis” and the eight life-stage psychosocial development model, Erik Erikson was born to a Jewish mother and a father whose identity was never revealed. He became a drifter and wandered the countryside for seven years before training and analysis by Anna Freud. Moving to the USA to escape Nazi persecution, he became the first child psychoanalyst in the Americas, and one of the key players of the “neo-Freudian” movement. Drawing on his own struggles with identity confusion while growing up and adjusting to American life, he wrote a series of books detailing the importance of identity in personality development and successful adjustment in life. He also coined the term “moratorium” to emphasize the need for time for adolescents and young adults to search for their own directions. His tomes on Martin Luther and Mahatma Gandhi have been bestsellers and are still regarded as classics. These books eloquently illustrate the role “identity crisis” played in shaping the lives and acts of prominent historical figures who profoundly changed the course of human history.

Israel defines itself as a ‘Jewish democratic state’, an expression that conveys the Jewish and liberal roots of its political, cultural and legal identity. In Jewish tradition, attempting to cure disease and save lives is of paramount value and Jewish culture hence encourages open-minded attitudes towards research efforts that have therapeutic goals. Zionist narratives also play a role in shaping policy towards genetic and reproductive technologies and pro-science attitudes echo the Zionist narrative that links scientific and technological innovation with the notion of transforming the Jews into a modern nation. Consequently, Israel does not ban basic research involving human germline modification and draws the line only at attempting to create a ‘genetically modified person’. Human germline genome modification is regulated in Israel under the 1999 Prohibition of Genetic Intervention (Human Cloning and Genetic Manipulation of Reproductive Cells) Law. This Law has been amended three times: in 2004, 2009 and 2016. The current version is set to expire on 23 May 2020. The Israeli Law prohibits two activities: human reproductive cloning, and the use of ‘reproductive cells that have undergone a permanent intentional genetic modification (germline gene therapy) in order to cause the creation of a person’.

Existing norms, rules, and institutions seem insufficient to govern solar geoengineering in the long term. This chapter recommends additional and feasible measures to help ensure that it is researched, developed, and – if appropriate – used in ways that improve human well-being, are sustainable, and are consistent with widely shared norms. This will be challenging for reasons such as political contestation, conflicting desires for early governance and the reduction of uncertainty, and the endeavor's speculative nature. The suggestions are divided into rough stages of indoor and small-scale outdoor research, large-scale outdoor research, and deployment. The suggested forms of governance are norms, standards, and best practices; cooperation among nonstate actors; institutionally affiliated committees; state law; international institutions, including one dedicated to solar geoengineering; and – most speculatively – a multilateral agreement. Among governance's functions are reducing uncertainty and environmental risks, synthesis and assessment of results, public engagement, and preventing premature implementation, international tensions, and harmful abatement displacement.