Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

2 results

The Problem of Blame
  • Making Sense of Moral Anger
  • Kelly McCormick
  • Published online:
    21 April 2022
    Print publication:
    05 May 2022
  • This book makes a case for the permissibility of reactive blame – the angry, harmful variety. Blame is a thorny philosophical problem, as it is notoriously difficult to specify the conditions under which an agent is deserving of blame, is deserving of blame in the basic sense, and furthermore why this is so.  Kelly McCormick argues that sharpening the focus to reactive, angry blame can both show us how best to characterize the problem itself, and suggest a possible solution to it, because even reactive blame is both valuable and deserved in the basic sense. Finally, McCormick shows how, despite the many facets of the dark side of blame, adopting an explicitly victim-centered approach highlights a powerful argument from empathy for retaining reactive blame and its attendant attitudes and practices.

  • 9 - Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant on anger

  • Edited by Lawrence Jost, University of Cincinnati, Julian Wuerth, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
  • Book:
    Perfecting Virtue
    Published online:
    04 February 2011
    Print publication:
    03 February 2011, pp 215-240

  • Summary

    This chapter considers three familiar cases of anger. The first two, of the Iranian family members and of Achilles, are cases of vengeful anger. The third case of anger is one of moral protest and outcry on behalf of others that then inspires an act of heroic courage. The chapter argues that certain forms of anger are, on a Kantian view, a morally necessary expression of our vulnerability, and takes up Aristotle, the Stoics (principally Seneca), and then Immanuel Kant. Seneca's Stoicism, as developed in On Anger, is the primary focus of the chapter. Kant takes many of his cues from the Stoics, including his famously wistful remarks about the "apathy" of the Stoic sage. The chapter sketches Kant's general view on emotions, pathological and practical, and gesture toward how we might understand the expressive function of moral anger on a Kantian view.