We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Online ordering will be unavailable from 17:00 GMT on Friday, April 25 until 17:00 GMT on Sunday, April 27 due to maintenance. We apologise for the inconvenience.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The chapter assesses the extent of integration of sustainable finance into the MiFID II and the IDD investor protection frameworks. The chapter explains why retail investors do not always act upon their investment preferences and the role of the investment product distributor in remedying investors’ value-action gap. The chapter discusses the main changes to the MiFID II and IDD frameworks by analysing the new sustainability-related definitions, the amended product suitability assessment, the amended product governance process, and the amended conflicts of interest procedure. The analysis argues that full cross-sectional consistency will not be achieved in the EU investor protection framework as only the MiFID II and IDD frameworks have been amended while rules covering other product distributors remain the same. It also highlights the problems of inconsistency caused by sustainable finance amendments to existing legislation, including when it comes to applying the definition of sustainability preferences, which refer to concepts of the Taxonomy Regulation and the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, and the lack of a complete Taxonomy covering social and governance perspectives in the amended MiFID II and IDD obligations.
Paternalistic forms of regulation for the retail investment market have been gradual and restrained, even though significant gaps exist between investors’ needs and market-based provision. As ordinary citizens reckon with a variety of savings needs and become financial citizens responsible for their own financial welfare provision, financial health is not merely an issue of individual fortunes but a social need. Adverse financial welfare consequences can at scale become a social issue, as is reflected in the social demands and critique entailing from the collapse of London and Capital Finance in the UK. The need for more regulatory paternalism goes beyond preventing mis-selling, and the outworking of welfare beyond point-of-sale remains relatively unconsidered. Post-sale welfare is, however, increasingly recognised for consumer credit and is slower to catch on in relation to savings needs and investments. This paper advocates that the regulator should not remain ambivalent about the need for more paternalistic interventions. Paternalistic protection is not only about shifting more burdens to the industry but also about the provision of public goods where there are standardised baseline needs for retail investors. This paper unpacks the roles of both the public and private sectors in addressing retail investors’ financial welfare needs.
The preceding chapter showed the piecemeal nature of regulatory protections for participants in the derivatives markets and explained how it has been justified on the basis that an alternative means of redress is available, namely private claims for mis-selling based upon ‘contract and negligence’. This chapter explores the reality of this type of private law claim. The argument focuses on those claims that are typically deployed by participants in the OTC derivatives markets and on the patterns that emerge from these mis-selling cases. The next chapter considers the related topic of contractual defences relied upon in this context. Together, these two chapters demonstrate why there have been so few successful mis-selling claims and question the assumptions behind the prevailing regulatory scheme.
Paradigmatic mis-selling claims involving OTC derivatives are based upon contract and tort law. Those types of claims, and the defences routinely deployed against them, are explored in subsequent chapters. We shall see in those chapters, as in later parts of the book, how the specialist mode of contractual interpretation adapted to the derivatives markets is integral to every stage of such claims. In many cases, in fact, it is decisive. However, the paradigmatic claims arising in this part of the financial markets are important not only for their own sake and for commercial law more broadly, but also because of how they relate to the regulatory rules in place to protect participants in the OTC derivatives markets, which is the concern of this chapter. In particular, as this chapter shows, the limitations of the regulatory schemes of redress in this context commensurately increase the significance of the private law claims explored in the remainder of this study.
Why has the cycle of product mis-selling, widespread consumer detriment, complaints and (eventually) the imposition of penalties and the securing of redress from the finance industry proved to be so hard to break? This paper examines the payment protection insurance (PPI) mis-selling scandal in the UK with a view to identifying whether the Financial Services Authority's experience in that matter is bringing the UK any closer to finding regulatory solutions that are likely to produce a meaningful advance in curbing mis-selling problems. The FSA has said that its actions taken in the PPI market illustrate the type of intervention that its successor, the Financial Conduct Authority, can be expected to make.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.