Traumatic memories of war can result in mental disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is characterized by intrusive trauma memories and severe stress responses with devastating personal and societal consequences. Current treatments teach patients to regulate trauma memories, but many experience a return of symptoms even after initially successful treatment. Neuroscience is discovering ways to permanently modify trauma memories and prevent the return of symptoms. Such memory modification techniques (MMTs) have great clinical potential but also important ethical, legal and social implications. In this article, the authors describe PTSD, the role of memory in PTSD, its effects on the brain, and the limitations of current treatment methods. Then, the state of the art of the neuroscience of MMTs is presented. Within this realistic scientific framework the authors will discuss the ethical, legal and social implications of MMTs for the treatment of war-induced PTSD, especially in a military population. Three major sets of issues will be focused on: safety and social justice concerns, concerns about threats to authenticity and identity, and the possible legal and moral duties to retain certain memories. Finally, the article concludes that within scientific reality, concerns are limited and do not outweigh the potential benefits of developing treatments for patients.

Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival approaches even while avoiding the problems these rivals face. In addition to arguing for this primary thesis, the paper also aims to suggest something about neuroethics generally: despite what some neuroethicists claim, new discoveries in neuroscience may not typically upend traditional views of morality. Rather, discoveries in neuroscience often provide us with new occasions to reflect on enduring questions about what it means to be human.