Theories of aggregated legislative intent posit that the legislative intent of parliament is what a significant enough proportion of legislators intended (e.g., legislative intent is p if a majority intend that p). After all, many think the same way about democracy (‘votes reveal the will of the people’) and about courts (‘a court decision is based on judicial voting’). The existing literature on aggregated legislative intent, however, tends to make two undefended assumptions: (i) Informed Assumption: all legislators have policy intentions; and (ii) Group Intent Assumption: the existence of an aggregated intent entails the existence of a group intent. Despite these assumptions being subject to great scrutiny, they largely remain undefended. This paper defends the Group Intent Assumption and shows that aggregated theories can survive with a weaker version of the Informed Assumption.

Legal systems across the world contain the obligation to prevent ‘absurd interpretations’ of law. In international law, an instruction to avoid ‘manifestly absurd’ interpretations can be found in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This gives rise to at least two questions that I will take up in this article. First, what is meant by the ‘absurd’ that is to be avoided in legal interpretation. The short answer to this question is: no one knows exactly. The absurd, by its very nature, resists definition in pre-given categories, as I will argue on the basis of four core thinkers on the absurd: Søren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Thomas Nagel. The second question is more technical and easier to answer: how should lawyers try to avoid absurd interpretations? Here, I turn to absurdist writing and the theatre of the absurd for assistance. Absurdist writing and theatre have developed a number of techniques to make the absurd appear, to let the audience experience that something is fundamentally out of tune. Lawyers use similar techniques, but in reverse and with an opposite purpose: they add exposition, narrative, reasonable language, and stable, rational legal personae. In this way, they boost the rationality and reasonableness of the legal order. However, to come full circle, it is exactly the pretension of rationality and reasonableness that makes the law vulnerable to manifestations of the absurd. The rationality of law is the springboard for the very same absurdity it tries to suppress.

There has been considerable debate in legal philosophy about how to attribute purposes to rules. Separately, within cognitive science, there has been a growing body of research concerned with questions about how people ordinarily attribute purposes. Here, we argue that these two separate fields might be connected by experimental jurisprudence. Across four studies, we find evidence for the claim that people use the same criteria to attribute purposes to physical objects and to rules. In both cases, purpose attributions appear to be governed not so much by original intention or by moral value as by current practice. We argue that these findings in the cognitive science of purpose attribution have implications for jurisprudential questions involving purposivist legal interpretation.

Nowadays, human rights law significantly impacts the regulation of armed conflict through two main processes: the “interpretation process”, whereby international humanitarian law is interpreted in light of human rights law's norms or concepts, and the “application process”, whereby human rights law applies in armed conflict alongside international humanitarian law. These processes raise complex problems with respect to the interplay between the two branches of international law. The aim of this paper is to propose an elaborated theoretical framework, based on legal theories of normative coherence, in order to address that interplay and to overcome the shortcomings of the formal mechanisms usually referred to in practice and legal scholarship. It is demonstrated that such a coherency-based approach recommends adapting the outcomes of the interpretation and application processes, either by modulating or displacing the inappropriate norm or regime, in light of substantial considerations.

The question of change has emerged as one of the main conceptual and empirical challenges for International Relations' practice turn. In the context of international law, such a challenge is brought into particularly stark relief due to the significant development of legal meaning through more informal, interpretive avenues, including through the judgments of international courts. This paper develops a framework for theorizing how interpretive legal practices generate normative content change in international law. Specifically, it uses the example of the development of international criminal law through the decisions of international criminal courts to analyze how legal interpretation can lead to normative change in practice. Drawing on interviews conducted with judges and legal officers at the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), I analyze how a community of legal practice centered around these courts was able to construct and alter legal meaning in international criminal law, and how such a potential for change was curbed by understandings of the interpretive process and the role of international courts dominant among international lawyers.

The second half of the twentieth century saw major improvements in the legal regime for fisheries management. This notwithstanding, the deep seas remain largely unregulated under international law, until recently only being covered by the general environmental and management provisions found in UNCLOS. In light of this regulatory gap, this article evaluates the potential law-making effects, if any, of the FAO Deep-Sea Fisheries Guidelines, a voluntary instrument designed to provide States with a regulatory framework for the management of their deep-sea fisheries. It considers how the Guidelines may inform, interpret and influence the content of the general high-sea obligations in UNCLOS. Despite the vagueness and generality of those provisions, some indication of their substantive content has been given in recent decisions, particularly the South China Sea Arbitration. By assessing their compatibility, and their level of acceptance by the international community, this article argues that the FAO Deep-Sea Guidelines are beginning to have a law-making effect by providing an authoritative interpretation of the general high-sea obligations found in UNCLOS relating to deep-sea fisheries.