The United States, despite its generally favorable rankings on international indices, has significant corruption problems. Those issues cannot be ignored, but neither should they be exaggerated or oversimplified. American corruption is not any one single problem: contrasts are apparent among the states, across regions, and at different levels of the federal system. Some are illegal, but other types are legal – or not clearly against the law. While corruption is a significant issue in the context of law enforcement, race relations, environmental policy, and public health, its sources, consequences, and context differ from one sector to the next. Inequalities along racial and class lines add further complexities and significantly affect the prospects of reform. Checking corruption and dealing with its consequences will be a matter not only of enacting and enforcing sound laws but of how well we govern ourselves within a large, complicated, multi-level, but fundamentally democratic constitutional framework.

As judged by our three proxy measures of corruption, the fifty states vary greatly in terms of the pervasiveness and types they experience. We analyze those contrasts employing a range of empirical measures and find the political, economic, and institutional factors matter greatly. Particularly intriguing are the ways contrasts in corruption relate to Daniel Elazar’s three major political subcultures – Moralistic, Individualistic, and Traditionalistic – and to the ways they differ and mingle state by state. Contrasts in our corruption measures are linked to a range of explanatory variables in ways consistent with theory. Such links to fundamental influences not only point to the systemic nature of corruption, its causes, and consequences, but also help explain its tenacity and the difficulties we face when we attempt to implement reforms.

The question of how corrupt the United States is has no single answer. After all, we lack an accepted definition of corruption and cannot directly measure what is usually a clandestine or contested kind of activity. Some corruption is clearly illegal, but other activities widely seen as corrupt, or corrupting, are legal – in some cases, constitutionally protected. There are different categories of corruption – at a minimum, it is important to distinguish between illegal and legal corruption – and the country is comprised of fifty different states, each (as Daniel Elazar has argued) a civil society in its own right, and each with multiple institutions where corruption might take root. Finally, the causes and consequences of corruption can differ significantly from one policy area or economic sector to the next. In this chapter, we lay out our agenda for analyzing American corruption, with an emphasis on the diversity of the federal system and the importance of looking carefully at different aspects of policy and politics.

While we cannot measure corruption directly, it is possible to employ a number of proxy variables. We describe three useful approaches, all contributing to our understanding of corruption in practice. The Corruption Convictions Index (CCI) employs US Department of Justice data on corruption convictions aggregated by state. The news-based Corruption Reflections Index (CRI) compares the states in terms of the number of stories mentioning corruption. While both the CCI and CRI are proxy measures of illegal corruption, our Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), derived from surveys of statehouse news reporters, compares the states in terms of both legal and illegal corruption broken down by branch of government. While each index has its limitations, the three collectively yield suggestive rankings of the fifty states, not only by indirectly estimating the overall scale of the problem in each state but also, with the CPI, contrasting illegal and legal varieties and perceived corruption by branches of government.

This chapter discusses corruption in the United States. In recent decades, as a narrow view of corruption has taken hold, the United States has experienced a significant increase in economic inequality and a decrease in social mobility. Despite the growing public discourse on economic inequality, concerns about the viability of a democratic system in the face of extreme economic inequalities have a long history. In recent years, corruption has been frequently invoked to describe the state of American politics, with business corporations and their ultra-wealthy owners indicated as possible culprits. In the United States, the notion of corporations having a corrupting effect dates back to the early days of the Republic, when it was feared that corporate charters could be granted by state legislatures as rewards for favors or bribes. This chapter’s main conclusion is that while illegal forms of corruption may be uncommon in the United States, its legal variants are widespread, and is further discussed in Chapter 9.

This chapter recognizes that definitions of corruption depend on a normative view of the polity, and such dependence should be recognized when debating corruption. In the context of a discussion of corruption in the United States, this chapter argues for the relevance of new “geographies of corruption,” and in particular, of legal forms of corruption. My interpretation of legal corruption in the United States is framed within a dynamic relationship between economic and political inequality, which may be mutually reinforcing.