For latecomer countries, one crucial decision is whether to follow the path of economic development traveled by rich countries or to seek out new trajectories. This book observes that latecomers do not always follow advanced countries’ paths; rather, they sometimes skip certain stages and even create their own paths by taking detours and pursuing leapfrogging. The need for detours arises due to the entry barriers, such as intellectual property rights restrictions, protectionist measures, and limited policy spaces under WTO. This book proposes an alternative to prevailing development thinking by focusing on nonlinearity and the multiplicity of pathways for latecomers. The book leaves several questions for future research, such as the rules and modus operandi of the government, and importance of initial conditions. Also, the political and economic power balance between global institutions and national actors determines the dynamics of global–local interfaces. This book does not engage much with the issue of sustainable development, but seeking alternative economic development strategies that produce fewer carbon emissions is consistent with the idea of nonlinearity and the multiplicity of developmental trajectories.

This book explores the coevolution of firms, sectors, regions, and national economies in the Global South and explains their economic performance as a dynamic outcome of interactions between the multiple levels of innovation systems. This book counters prevailing views on economic development and offers a unique contribution to the literature on economic catch-up. Whereas the traditional linear view of development has taken a “more is better” approach, this book advocates that latecomers should pursue detours or leapfrogging, which conforms with a “less is better” approach. Instead of the conventional prioritization of manufacturing, this book proposes prioritizing domestic ownership and knowledge in specific sectors and regions and asserts that no country has successfully developed a high-income economy without generating a certain number of globally recognized big businesses. Instead of placing priority on free markets as the Washington Consensus does, this book argues that economic catch-up is only possible with active and planned government interventions, which are needed to overcome latecomers’ disadvantages regarding barriers to entry at the middle-income stage.

Sub-Saharan Africa has seen an extraordinary technological take-up. As recently as a decade ago, fewer than 5 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans had access to the Internet but by December 2020, approximately 85 per cent of Kenyans and 73 per cent of Nigerians had internet access. Growing connectivity is empowering a generation with opportunities that would have been unthinkable a little as 10 years ago. Young sub-Saharan Africans are using tech-based solutions across agriculture, education, finance, healthcare and infrastructure, to develop African economies at lower cost and faster speed. The use of smartphones, which enable greater use of mobile technology, is also growing. Nigeria’s mobile economy is set to grow by 19 per cent between 2019 and 2025 – the highest rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the fastest-growing mobile technology region in the world. Mobile technologies and services generated 9 per cent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 – a contribution that amounted to more than US$155 billion of economic value and supported almost 3.8 million jobs. This reflects the fact that in some areas – such as the mobile financial sector – sub-Saharan Africa has become a global leader.

Sub-Saharan Africa has seen an extraordinary technological take-up. As recently as a decade ago, fewer than 5 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans had access to the Internet but by December 2020, approximately 85 per cent of Kenyans and 73 per cent of Nigerians had internet access. Growing connectivity is empowering a generation with opportunities that would have been unthinkable a little as 10 years ago. Young sub-Saharan Africans are using tech-based solutions across agriculture, education, finance, healthcare and infrastructure, to develop African economies at lower cost and faster speed. The use of smartphones, which enable greater use of mobile technology, is also growing. Nigeria’s mobile economy is set to grow by 19 per cent between 2019 and 2025 – the highest rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the fastest-growing mobile technology region in the world. Mobile technologies and services generated 9 per cent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 – a contribution that amounted to more than US$155 billion of economic value and supported almost 3.8 million jobs. This reflects the fact that in some areas – such as the mobile financial sector – sub-Saharan Africa has become a global leader.

Building on Chapter 5 and embedded in a discussion of two competing paradigms – Africa as “hopeless” and “hopeful” continent – this chapter deals with the economic and socioeconomic situation after 2000. It discusses various geopolitical and economic changes that took place since then, including the rise of China and efforts to give the continent a “big push”, which culminated in the “Year for Africa” 2005. It shows that there have been more trading partners, more consumption, more foreign direct investment, more private economic activities, more efforts against corruption, and leapfrogging. The chapter also discusses the shape and importance of the informal sector and turns to the socioeconomic development, providing facts and figures. The Millennium Development Goals and their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals as well as to what extent African states have achieved them are analysed as is the effectiveness of development aid.

Our interviews reveal that most judges from the CJEU and Supreme Administrative Courts realize there is at the moment little room for a dialogue that goes beyond one party asking questions and the other party answering them. Procedural mechanisms that could be used to facilitate a dialogue between both courts, such as: requests for clarification, provisional answers and leaving more leeway for highest courts to scrutinize potential preliminary questions before they are send to the CJEU, are relatively unpopular. A better “horizontal dialogue” between national courts before referring questions to the CJEU is considered useful by all parties but is troubled by language barriers, time constraints, and a failing communication infrastructure. Although better informed questions in combination with provisional answers could enhance the “vertical dialogue” with the CJEU, certainly not every judge is looking for this. We discovered major differences between on the one hand the judge-lawmaker, who wants to influence the way EU law is interpreted and the judge-arbiter, who is primarily focused on settling disputes. The latter judges feel the CJEU is better equipped to develop the course of EU law, while the former judges believe that in a multilevel legal order, this should be a mutual responsibility.