State and local governments put hundreds of referendums on the ballot each year. Often, they pass but sometimes they fail. What happens after a successful or failed attempt at the ballot box? Do advocates go back to voters with another request? And if they do, do they tend to succeed? We employ a regression discontinuity empirical framework to causally estimate referendum dynamics in the arena of land conservation. Our results suggest municipalities where a referendum just barely fails hold about 0.5 more referendums and pass about 0.28 more referendums than municipalities that just barely pass, meaning initial defeat is often reversed. We also investigate whether strategic changes are made in election approaches for those that try again. We find no evidence of systematic patterns in strategic revisions for municipalities that fail their first referendum. However, when revisions are made, our evidence suggests that voters appear to respond positively.

This paper examines transferable development rights (TDRs) policies as a way to preserve farmland and change the density of development. Characteristics of TDR markets are described, including why they might promote efficiency, and the difficulties that arise in implementing them. Evidence from an established TDR program in Calvert County, Maryland, is used to assess the potential for TDRs to influence subdivision density, and to achieve local land preservation goals. The Calvert program has succeeded in creating an active and stable TDR market, and has therefore preserved a large amount of farmland in the region. But we find that the demand for additional density permitted with TDRs occurs mostly in rural areas and not in the higher density town centers and residential areas.