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2 results

  • Against obstructivism

  • Josh Dolin
  • Journal:
    Episteme , First View
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    23 January 2025, pp. 1-12
    • Article
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  • For Quassim Cassam, intellectual vices obstruct knowledge. On his view, that’s what makes them vices. But obstructing knowledge seems unnecessary. Some intellectual vices can manifest passively without obstructing knowledge. What’s more, obstructing knowledge seems insufficient. Some traits of intellectual character, not yet matured to full virtues, obstruct knowledge but earn us no blame or criticism. A motive-based theory of intellectual vice – a rival theory – can handle both of these issues.

  • Chapter 1 - Closed-Mindedness As an Intellectual Vice

  • Edited by Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC
  • Book:
    Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
    Published online:
    16 July 2020
    Print publication:
    23 July 2020, pp 15-41

  • Summary

    What is closed-mindedness, and if it is an intellectual vice, what makes it so? This is the second in a series of three papers on closed-mindedness. It adopts a working analysis of closed-mindedness as an unwillingness or inability to engage seriously with relevant intellectual options. It distinguishes between three different kinds of intellectual vice – effects vice, responsibilist vice, and personalist vice – and argues that closed-mindedness can take each of these forms.