We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 3 examines Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–8). This chapter explores why, and the conditions under which, Saudi Arabia and Syria diverged in their perceptions of threats emanating from both Iran and Iraq. While Saudi Arabia perceived the revolutionary message of the Islamic Republic as the major source of threat, Syria perceived Iraq’s rising military capabilities as most dangerous. The Saudi case illustrates a situation where identity is immutable while the distribution of military capabilities presented the leadership with multiple options. Due to the lack of multiplicity in Saudi regime identity based on pan-Islamism, ideational sources of threats became predominant in leaders’ perception. The Syrian case illustrates a situation, where the regime identity included multiple narratives and the distribution of military capabilities imposed threats emerging from the military capabilities from both Iraq and Israel. The material constraints left the Syrian leadership with limited policy options to ensure the state’s physical security. Syrian leaders forced a reframing and reinterpretation of the regime’s identity to accommodate the material constraints and to render its alliance with Iran against a fellow Arab regime in Iraq plausible. Arabness was reinterpreted as the struggle against Israel instead of unity among Arabs.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.