Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

3 results

God, the Good, and the Spiritual Turn in Epistemology
  • Roberto Di Ceglie
  • Published online:
    19 August 2022
    Print publication:
    18 August 2022
  • In this book, Roberto Di Ceglie offers an historical, theological, and epistemological investigation exploring how commitments to God and/or the good generate the optimum condition to achieve knowledge. Di Ceglie criticizes the common belief that to attain knowledge, one must always be ready to replace one's convictions with beliefs that appear to be proven. He defends a more comprehensive view, historically exemplified by outstanding Christian thinkers, whereby believers are expected to commit themselves to God and to related beliefs no matter how convincing the evidence contradicting such beliefs appears to be. He also argues that both believers and unbelievers can commit themselves to God and the good, respectively, thereby creating a spiritual turn in epistemology that enables them to generate the best possible condition for conducting rational enquiries and discussion.

  • Introduction

  • Roberto Di Ceglie
  • Book:
    God, the Good, and the Spiritual Turn in Epistemology
    Published online:
    19 August 2022
    Print publication:
    18 August 2022, pp 1-8

  • Summary

    The author shows the limits of the common assumption that beliefs supported by more evidence should always be preferred to beliefs supported by less evidence. This assumption falls into self-referential contradiction; furthermore, it does not explain inconclusiveness, that is, the property of debates – especially the religious ones – whose protagonists are not ready to change their mind, however convincing contrary evidence may appear to them to be.