This chapter conceptualizes technical standards and ICT standards, discussing their types and functions. It then introduces different types of standards development organization (SDOs), focusing in particular on competitive dynamics among standards developers. While discussing ICT standardization as a regime of private transnational governance, this chapter offers a theoretical background on non-State regulatory arrangements and explains how voluntary standards created in different types of SDOs may acquire a binding force. To that end, this chapter reviews the relevant scholarship in the field of global governance, transnational private regulation, and global administrative law, outlining the normative framework of this study.

This chapter conceptualizes technical standards and ICT standards, discussing their types and functions. It then introduces different types of standards development organization (SDOs), focusing in particular on competitive dynamics among standards developers. While discussing ICT standardization as a regime of private transnational governance, this chapter offers a theoretical background on non-State regulatory arrangements and explains how voluntary standards created in different types of SDOs may acquire a binding force. To that end, this chapter reviews the relevant scholarship in the field of global governance, transnational private regulation, and global administrative law, outlining the normative framework of this study.

This chapter examines political risk insurance as an alternative to international investment treaties, looking at some of the world’s leading providers of this service. It continues with a consideration of investment incentives, followed by a discussion of some of the main sources for further information on international investment law. This chapter then offers a concluding overview of some of the central debates in international investment law.

Chapter 4 examines the ways that transnational regulatory regimes are organized and governed. It also explores how the tension explored in Chapter 3 between a functional concern for efficacy and a functional concern for interest balancing finds resonance in a tension between a regime adopting a more exclusivist form of governance called the ‘club model’ or a more inclusive form of governance the chapter refers to as the ‘pluralist model’ – with the pluralist model being further divided into a more hierarchical form called the multi-stakeholder initiative, and a more decentralized form called networks. All have their own set of comparative advantages and disadvantages. Also explored is how the interaction between these two models of governance, on the one hand, and the two kinds of regulatory functions explored in Chapter 3, on the other, can give rise to issues of ‘operational legitimacy’. Finally, Chapter 4 investigates efforts to constrain possible abuses of power by transnational governance regimes, much like public law works to constrain possible abused of power by domestic governments. These efforts are generally referred to as ‘global administrative law’.

Chapter 6 explores the anti-law quality of the UN’s managerial governance of security threats. Foucault explained that disciplinary power is incompatible with juridico-political commitments to rights and equality. Such critiques are often made of global governance, especially when it takes security as its object, but they often assume that managerial technologies can be redeemed by making them more juridico-political. This chapter shows that they cannot be redeemed. It discusses the UN's redemption strategy of imbuing its counter-terrorism strategy with human rights. The second redemption strategy is the Global Administrative Law project which, taking managerial technologies of accountability and transparency as imperfect juridical forms, sees them as ripe for improvement along juridico-political lines. The third redemptions strategy discussed is the Global Experimental Governance project, which affirms constellations of governance that valorize participation, especially by civil society, as a step in a democratic direction. The chapter concludes that none of these redemption strategies can succeed because, as Foucault foresaw, articulating juridico-political forms into management’s mechanics of power supresses radical structural criticism. The best law can do is mitigate the harm caused by security management.

It is shown that the form of an institution, its legal character, and membership do not determine procedural density.

The finding that the procedural density regarding an activity is zero is very prevalent in the sample. The reasons for this usually lie in low state interest, which is demonstrated via case studies of the European Advertising Standards Alliance and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

During coding, there were certain procedural steps which occurred more frequently than others but no distinct patterns of combinations of procedural steps. This leads me to assume that procedure as a design element is valued for its variety and flexibility.

Whether an activity is hard or soft law or somewhere in between greatly determines state interest in procedural justice. This is further explored via a case study of the Human Development Index.

Like the legal character, the exact characteristics of an administrative activity affect procedural density. This is illustrated using the different branches of the International Telecommunications Union and their procedure.

Of the different kinds of procedural steps, review is by far the least prevalent because it strongly affects state interests and often juxtaposes them with individual rights and interests. This is illustrated with comparative case studies of the Interpol Commission for the Control of Files and the ICANN Independent Review Procedure.

Procedural justice in the shape of procedural steps is a more flexible design tool than an institution's different organs. All things being equal, it is therefore preferred. This is demonstrated by the decentralized compliance monitoring mechanism used by the International Electrotechnical Commission.

The main findings from the empirical research are summarized.

The empirical research gap in GAL is introduced. Further, it is shown why procedure is an important element in institutional design from an international relations perspective.

GAL is one of the most ambitious projects to capture the role of procedure in global governance. Other concepts are briefly introduced and compared. The idea of procedural justice as akin to GAL in scope but focusing on perceptions of fairness and legitimacy rather than normativity emerges.

The main strands of international relations theory regarding institutions are briefly introduced. The work focuses on rational choice, notably Rational Institutional Design theory.

To unite the concept of procedural justice with the perspective and methods of rational institutional design, the factor of state interest is studied. It is shown how state interest can operate even within nominally private institutions and which factors determine whether and how a state is interested in introducing procedural justice.

The codebook variables creating the matrix of sensitivity of state interest - quantitative and qualitative procedural density is introduced. The mode of sample collection is explained.

The chapter investigates the role of domestic courts in the management of foreign relations (FRs). Combining insights from ongoing trends towards the ‘administrativisation’ of the jurisdictional function and the theoretical approach of Global Administrative Law (GAL), it explores whether and to what extent domestic judicial bodies “administer” FRs, establish coordination relationships and potentially develop a ‘common language’. The GAL approach brings out the role of global regulators of courts in a domain where their influence is often underestimated. With a varying degree of awareness, courts contribute to determine States’ FRs, and this role in contemporary constitutional systems has become structural. However, a survey on the judicial practice in this field suggests that the intervention of judicial bodies may lead to greater disorder, conflict and de-stabilization, thus – and paradoxically – frustrating the purposes of ordering the structures of global governance underlying the GAL project.

Chapter 3 focuses on the problem of accountability in global governance. It follows what happens when UN sanctions powers originally designed to discipline states are used to target individuals suspected of being associated with terrorism. It provides a detailed genealogical account of the emergence of the UN1267 Office of the Ombudsperson - a procedural mechanism created by the Security Council in 2009 to provide redress to listed individuals. Most scholars argue that the Ombudsperson is an important step in the right direction towards greater human rights compliance by international organisations. This chapter challenges this narrative of global legal progress by advancing two main arguments. First, that different actors in the listing assemblage enact fundamentally different versions of the list through their practice. The ISIL and Al-Qaida list is best thought of as what STS scholars call a ‘multiple object’. Second, the Ombudsperson is an important figure of legal expertise that helps contain this multiplicity and hold the different strands of the listing assemblage together. This chapter closes by arguing that the Ombudsperson’s delisting processes and practices are primarily concerned with embedding new forms of preemptive security, aligning different actors and smoothing over conflicts of the list.

Chapter 7 concludes the book by providing a wider theoretical perspective on the intervention of international courts in domestic affairs. First, the chapter compares established theories of domestic judicial review to the insights this book developed on "international judicial review" – namely intervention by international courts. The literature on domestic judicial review is rich and often inspiring, but international courts face special circumstances that make drawing comparisons with domestic judicial review a complicated undertaking. Finally, to elaborate on the special conditions faced by international courts, the chapter outlines the characteristics of the global arena today: a complicated network with links that cut across national boundaries and formal hierarchies.

This chapter reviews the accomplishments of the networks that form the periphery, rather than the core, of financial regulation, and places them into the larger context of international financial regulation. It is organized around their roles in the signature post-crisis regulatory institution: The Financial Stability Board’s “Compendium of Standards,” which looks to core principles from networks beyond the Basel Commission, IOSCO, and IAIS that it views as fundamental for a well-working system of financial oversight. The existence of so many financial regulatory institutions, even if some are quite small and amount to little more than task forces within the ambit of the Basel Committee, suggests that financial regulation still remains a task-specific, disaggregated enterprise. Consider, for example, deposit insurance. It is conceivable that the Basel Committee or IAIS could develop principles for effective deposit insurance on their own; deposit insurance contributes to financial stability, which is the raison d’etre of the Basel Committee, and it’s an insurance product that insurance supervisors, in theory, understand (perhaps only in theory – deposit insurance is more commonly thought of as a tool for bank regulators). The fact that Basel and the IAIS haven’t done so is a testament to the regulatory fragmentation of financial oversight.

This chapter evaluates the differences–and surprising similarities–between financial regulation, which does not count as “hard” law and international law, which does count as hard law. As it turns out, though, both depend on domestic institutions to enforce their rules, both institutions are negotiated and iterative, rather than fixed and stable, and both are best at facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation, rather than resolving zero sum disputes.Understanding how international financial regulation achieves its legitimacy through a series of domestic processes, rather than an international one gleaned from state practice and treaty commitments, provides a perspective on public international law.