This chapter considers the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as articulated in the New International Economic Order (NIEO) project. At the NIEO’s core was the push to consolidate the legal status of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over natural resources. This idea’s champions argued that ownership and control of resources is an essential and necessary element of statehood, one that involves the right to nationalize foreign-held property. By contrast, its critics contended that no state could lawfully seize assets of foreign investors without compensation. They also insisted that the quantity of such compensation should be determined by international law, or through international arbitration, in the event of disagreement. While most aspects of the NIEO, including resource sovereignty, had been debated for some time, partly during broader discussions of neocolonialism and uneven development within the UN Conference on Trade and Development, it was only in 1974 that the project was formalized in a set of General Assembly resolutions. This project was largely the expression of a desire on the part of political and legal elites in the global South to renegotiate their roles in the world capitalist system, reforming rather than repudiating the existing international order.

In this chapter, Nigel White assesses the contribution of the UN’s collective security system to the settlement of international disputes. This chapter tests the assumption that impartial law-based dispute settlement by the Security Council is neither achievable because of its political nature nor required by the UN Charter. This chapter analyses the provisions of the Charter and practice of the Security Council in the field of peaceful settlement, looking for evidence of impartiality in both inter-State and intra-State disputes and assessing the influence of peacekeeping mandated by the Council upon impartiality. This analysis shows that the concept of impartiality in peaceful settlement has largely disappeared and asks, in the conclusion, whether it is possible and desirable to (re)turn to impartiality.

This chapter revisits UN General Assembly resolution 181(II) recommending the partition of Palestine. It undertakes critical international legal analysis of the resolution with reference to the work of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine whose report formed the basis of the resolution. Contrary to the traditional historiography, this chapter posits that the resolution was neither procedurally ultra vires the General Assembly, nor were its terms substantively consistent with prevailing international law as regards self-determination of peoples. Set against the larger context of the international legal status of Palestine from WWI to the end of the British Mandate, this chapter argues that resolution 181(II) was the opening act in the reification of Palestine’s legal subalternity within the newly minted UN system. It demonstrates that the resolution was an embodiment, in legal terms, of the lingering tension between the rule by law of late-European empire and the ostensible rule of law of the post-WWII era. It also shows that the resolution helped hasten the dissolution of Palestine and the dispersal of its people, the consequences of which remain with us today.

This chapter critically examines Palestine’s unsuccessful 2011 UN membership bid. It examines the report of the UN Committee on the Admission of New Members which, under US pressure, could not unanimously recommend Palestine’s membership to the Security Council after examining whether Palestine satisfied the criteria for membership as set out in article 4(1) of the UN Charter. Propelled by this unsuccessful bid, Palestine turned to the General Assembly which upgraded its status to that of a non-Member Observer State in 2012. Although the legal consequences of this upgrade have been considerable, including allowing the State of Palestine to accede to a host of international treaties and multilateral organizations, its juxtaposition against the refusal of the Committee on the Admission of New Members to recommend membership to the Security Council in accordance with the international rule of law is demonstrative, yet again, of the international rule by law principle at work. Although the UN has allowed for a gradual and qualified recognition of Palestinian legal subjectivity over time, its failure to provide the legal and political foundation upon which those rights may actually be realized, namely membership in the Organization, has continued to disenfranchise Palestine and its people.

This chapter critically examines the distinctive institutional and normative regime created by the UN for the Palestinian refugees in the immediate aftermath of the Nakba in the form of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. It juxtaposes that regime against the international institutional and normative regime applicable to all other refugees in the world, as administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The special regime for Palestinian refugees is widely regarded as reflective of the UN’s unique responsibility for their plight. Yet, a critical examination of the UN record on the early history, mandate, and regulatory framework underpinning this regime reveals that it was never intended to give effect to Palestinian refugee rights as established under prevailing international law, including as affirmed by the UN itself. The resulting ‘protection gap’ that has consequently emerged for Palestinian refugees, marked by uneven and confused state practice concerning their plight as well as ongoing gender discrimination against them by the UN, is demonstrative of the Organization’s role in the maintenance of Palestinian legal subalternity on the international plane.

The chapter begins with a brief summary of the theory and findings. It then examines whether the strong relationship between electoral autocracies and Chinese foreign spending is evident among a wider range of issues based on analysis of United Nations General Assembly votes. The findings indicate that electoral autocracies have displayed a markedly higher propensity to vote with China since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. The chapter then discusses theoretical, policy, and business implications in turn.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the use of force under the auspices of the UN, in particular the Security Council. Chapter 3 first sets out and examines the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and the division of competence between the various organs of the UN – the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat – to provide an understading as to how force was originally envisaged as being employed under the auspices of the UN. Given the Security Council’s primacy both within the Charter and in practice, the chapter goes on to examine the specific powers of the Council in relation to the use of forcible measures within the Charter and the limitations imposed upon these. Following this it then examines how these powers and responsibilities have been implemented in practice in both the Cold War and post-Cold War era. In particular, it has developed the practice of ‘authorising’ states, coalitions of states and regional organisations to use force to implement its mandate. The chapter finally addresses the relationship between the UN and regional – and, by extension, collective defence – organisations in the context of the use of force.

The human rights to water and sanitation (HRtWS) have their genesis, history and interpretations. They are also subject to tension, controversy and dispute. A studied approach to these foundations is necessary in order to ensure a basis for their formulation, implementation, evaluation and monitoring. For the approach to the three dimensions that make up the analytical framework used in this book, an understanding of these aspects is not only desirable but necessary. Understanding the factors involved in the realization or violation of HRtWS, the ways in which the policies actually reach them, to a greater or lesser degree, and the population groups at particular risk, pre-supposes clarity regarding the different approaches for the rights and the elements that underlie each of these. In this context, the objective of this part of the book is to provide elements for the reader to get a closer view of these fundamentals, to get a more complete understanding of the topic and, from there, to have a theoretical-conceptual basis to address drivers, policies and people.

It is shown that the form of an institution, its legal character, and membership do not determine procedural density.

The finding that the procedural density regarding an activity is zero is very prevalent in the sample. The reasons for this usually lie in low state interest, which is demonstrated via case studies of the European Advertising Standards Alliance and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

During coding, there were certain procedural steps which occurred more frequently than others but no distinct patterns of combinations of procedural steps. This leads me to assume that procedure as a design element is valued for its variety and flexibility.

Whether an activity is hard or soft law or somewhere in between greatly determines state interest in procedural justice. This is further explored via a case study of the Human Development Index.

Like the legal character, the exact characteristics of an administrative activity affect procedural density. This is illustrated using the different branches of the International Telecommunications Union and their procedure.

Of the different kinds of procedural steps, review is by far the least prevalent because it strongly affects state interests and often juxtaposes them with individual rights and interests. This is illustrated with comparative case studies of the Interpol Commission for the Control of Files and the ICANN Independent Review Procedure.

Procedural justice in the shape of procedural steps is a more flexible design tool than an institution's different organs. All things being equal, it is therefore preferred. This is demonstrated by the decentralized compliance monitoring mechanism used by the International Electrotechnical Commission.

The main findings from the empirical research are summarized.

A power on the part of the General Assembly of the United Nations to decide on a partition of Palestine was said to flow from the text of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter, however, gives the General Assembly decision-making powers only with respect to issues internal to the United Nations. It was argued that the member states construed the Charter so as to give it a power to partition Palestine. In response, it was argued that the member states did not do so. Many of them wanted the International Court of Justice to decide that point. It was argued that even if the Charter did not explicitly give a power to partition Palestine, such a power was implied by the Charter. In response, it was argued that there was no basis for such an implication.

Apart from the issue of forced expulsion, the issue of an obligation to repatriate could have been put to the International Court of Justice. Populations are deemed to have a right to be repatriated when exodus occurs, it was argued. They also have a right to nationality when sovereignty changes in a territory. The United States pressured the Provisional Government of Israel to repatriate. The Provisional Government of Israel denied an obligation to repatriate. It blamed the Arab states for the exodus and said that the populations of displaced Arabs became the responsibility of those states. It said that repatriation while the situation was unsettled would give the Arab states a military advantage. It said that repatriation could be considered only in the context of peace agreements with the Arab states. It said that nationality did not have to be offered to the displaced Arabs because they had shown disloyalty by departing. The General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for repatriation and established a three-nation committee to oversee its implementation.

In late 1948, the General Assembly scheduled a major debate to consider what the General Assembly might do to resolve the conflict. Syria and the other Arab states again proposed that the International Court of Justice be asked for an advisory opinion. Twenty-one states voted in favor, the same number, twenty-one, voted against, and four abstained. That split meant there was not a majority in favor, so the proposal failed. In December 1948 in the Security Council, Syria again forced a vote on the issue but again fell short.

Chapter 3 considers the meaning of an ‘act of aggression’, defined in Article 8bis (2) of the Rome Statute. It opens with a comparative analysis of the terminology employed in the UN Charter to describe inter-State armed force. It then summarises the shortcomings of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly (GA) Resolution 3314 (1974), which provided a basis for Article 8bis (2). Among other things, it is demonstrated that the 3314 Definition does not reflect the understanding of an act of aggression seen in the practice of the UN Security Council, GA, or the International Court of Justice. It is also explained how some of the 3314 Definition’s shortcomings were exacerbated by the selective use of its provisions in Article 8bis (2). In addition, the chapter considers the treatment of the acts of non-State actors, and cyber operations and emerging weapons technologies. Finally, the chapter analyses the status of the ‘Understandings’ adopted by the ICC Assembly of States Parties alongside the aggression amendments, and their effect on our understanding of the definition of the State act element of the crime.

A legacy of the Cold War is that nuclear arms protect nations from attack; a stance that supporters of the TPNW wish to change. Indeed, this author would contend that nuclear weapons do not protect nations but actually threaten national, regional and global security. Many advocates of nuclear disarmament believe that the TPNW marks a new beginning; it was even celebrated with the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), at the time, a relatively newly formed civil society organization. The TPNW demonstrates international support to take decisive action to eliminate nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to international peace and security.

Though protestations have been little studied as an early modern mode of resistance, in Scotland the protestation was transformed from a routine means of expressing formal dissent into an assertive mode of collective resistance. Protestations in political settings challenged royal and institutional authority with public statements of argument, highlighting the views of groups outside authorised assemblies. Extra weight could be provided by collecting the signatures of adherents, stimulating opinion at large, while the trope of Christian testimony provided a justification for the disruption of strong cultural norms for consensus. This chapter reveals the use of protestations for and against ecclesiastical and constitutional innovations in Scotland, including the creation of ‘the Protesters’ in 1650 and the making of public testimonies by hardline dissenters in the Restoration period.

Like the protestation, the petition helped to make extra-institutional opinion more visible in early modern Scotland. Petitions were a traditional tool for initiating dialogue, normally in humble terms that emphasised the pleas of the petitioner and the authority of the recipient. Buoyed by religious convictions, political petitioners in Scotland defied these norms by presenting conscientious arguments reinforced with signatures and crowds. They might even petition repeatedly when answers were unsatisfactory. Though these adversarial political activities capitalised on the conventional idea that a good prince should hear the grievances of his people, successive monarchs sought to constrain what they saw as seditious and tumultuous behaviour. This chapter traces episodes of assertive petitioning in Scotland, showing how petitioning stimulated and expressed opinions at large, especially under James VI and Charles I, and how the crown responded to these challenges with the suppression of unwelcome petitioning from the Restoration to the Revolution.

Oaths were ubiquitous in late medieval society, binding men to political structures and leaders. With the Reformation in Scotland, oaths became an important tool of indoctrination and engagement, used by early reformers and later dissidents to bind the consciences of male and female followers and by the crown to weed dangerous opinions out of government and wider society. From 1581, reformers linked assertory confessional oaths, traditional Scottish bands promising mutual aid and the Old Testament trope of the covenanted nation to create powerful collective oaths taken by men and women in parishes across Scotland. The swearing of the King’s Confession, the National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant allowed the nation’s commitments to be invoked to justify political demands, even when actual opinions were divided. This chapter examines the development of collective oaths from the reign of James VI, tracing an unfolding battle to control the opinions of subjects at large, including, under James VII, a brief experiment in the lifting of all oaths except civil allegiance.

We present an overview of the evolution of the United Nations General Assembly, its most important achievements and remaining weaknesses and relevance. It is argued that the UN Charter should be amended to introduce a system of weighted voting, to better reflect the relative significance and influence of its 193 members. A proposal is put forward that uses three variables to arrive at a set of weights for membership in the General Assembly: (i) population size, to reflect each member’s accumulated demographic history so that countries with larger populations will have a larger voice; (ii) the size of the member’s economy; and (iii) a UN membership factor that is equal for all countries. For the GDP variable, the weighted average of GDP at market prices and GDP at PPP rates is used. The merits and limitations of such a scheme are analyzed and a gradual system of direct election of Assembly members is proposed. The chapter also presents the UN Charter’s Articles 9–11 on General Assembly composition, functions and powers and discusses how these Articles should be amended to reflect the new system of weighted voting and the enhanced powers that are envisaged for the Assembly under a revised Charter.