The Mughals tried their hand at empire building twice in early modern south Asia. The first attempt in the early sixteenth century was thwarted by a resurgence of Afghan power in north India. Following a brief hiatus, the second – and more successful – attempt ensued in the mid-sixteenth century under the rule of the third emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605). During the half-century of his rule, Mughal armies conquered most of north India and started expanding fur-ther towards the south, north-west and east. The war in the south consumed much of Mughal energy under his successors for the next hundred years and brought most of the Indian pen-insula under imperial control by the early eighteenth century. In contrast, several wars in the north-west and the east consumed many imperial resources without bringing much lasting ter-ritorial gain. The present chapter focuses on the evolving nature of strategy that went into the making of this vast empire. It discusses the ways in which imperial armies negotiated various types of adversary, the different motivations behind military expeditions, the methods of mili-tary planning and mobilisation, and finally the kind of political expansion all of this brought about. Reflecting on contemporary imperial texts that serve as our main historical sources today, it also seeks to understand their cultural politics as well as the nature of strategic objectives they fulfilled within the political milieu where they were written and circulated. The chapter especially seeks to understand the role of strategy both in the military success that Mughal armies met with in most of south Asia and in the multiple failures that they encountered, especially on its north-western and eastern frontiers. In the process, it shows how Mughal strategy was neither frozen in time nor isolated in its existence. Rather, the c hapter highlights the changing nature of Mughal strategy and how it constantly evolved through its interactions with diplomacy, warfare, ideology, environment, culture and resource mobilisation.