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Whitman, of course, was the evangelist for first-person subjective experience. In Chapter 3, I argued that understanding should be seen as including a subjective feeling, an emotion, and an objective achievement. Feelings and emotions are characterized as having such properties as valence, strength, and “content.” That content is conferred by an appraisal of the current situation in the light of prior experience; thus, different appraisals evoke different feelings. I will refer to the content of a feeling state as an intuition with “identity conditions” that may be quite different from those for concepts and beliefs.
Previous research has provided evidence of metamemory impairments in
patients with frontal lobe damage on verbal episodic memory tasks. In the
present study, we employed metamemory paradigms to investigate whether
patients with frontal lesions show monitoring deficits on semantic memory
tasks involving facial stimuli. Patients with frontal lobe damage and
healthy control subjects made memory decisions to famous faces in a
retrospective confidence judgment task and in a prospective
feeling-of-knowing (FOK) task. Results indicated that frontal patients
performed worse than controls on the retrospective confidence task, but
there were no differences between the groups on the FOK task. These
findings suggest that metamemory deficits in frontal patients are not
confined to specific stimulus domains (words vs. faces) or memory
systems (episodic vs. semantic). In addition, the dissociation
between retrospective confidence judgments and FOK accuracy documented in
this study and also in a recent report by Schnyer et al. suggesting that
metamemory should not be considered a unitary function with a single
neuroanatomic substrate. (JINS, 2005, 11,
668–676.)
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