Epistemologists and non-philosophers find the Moorean reasoning unattractive. It is not easy to locate the source of this dissatisfaction, however. This chapter argues that it arises from requirements of responsibility that apply to rational agents in the course of conscious reasoning or deliberation. Dogmatism alone isn't enough to evade standard arguments for skepticism about the external world. Warrants are things of a type that is suited to play the role of normative epistemic reasons in an agent's deliberations about what to believe. A person might have a warrant to believe a particular proposition, believe that proposition, and yet not hold that belief in a reasonable, epistemically appropriate, or epistemically satisfactory way. The external world skeptic holds that no one is doxastically justified in believing anything about the external world by means of the senses. The Moorean dogmatist diagnoses this skeptical claim as arising from a principle about experiential warrant.