In this chapter, we argue that differences in problem-solving experiences can be traced to differences in the activation of brain structures involved in the unconscious processing of information (what we refer to as “the backstage”). Scientists commonly distinguish between two major types of problem-solving experiences: via insight and via analysis. Three properties are often mentioned when describing how insight solutions differ from analytic solutions: (1) Solvers are unable to report much of the processing that leads to the solution which comes to mind in an off–on manner; (2) Solvers experience their solutions together with a feeling of pleasure and reward; (3) Solutions via insight feel correct and they actually are. This is captured by a distinctive response: the Aha! This chapter focuses on these three properties and argues that unconscious processes are important for problem-solving in general, but especially important for insight experiences because most of the processing that leads to the solution happens below awareness. It also argues that the positive affect associated with insight serves an adaptive function.

In this chapter, I outline Aristotle’s theory of moral education and the central role friendships can play in the cultivation of virtue in students. I pay special attention to what are referred to as friendships of virtue, or perfect friendships, or character friendships. I examine the necessary connection Aristotle sees between virtue and a flourishing life, as well as how Aristotle believes virtue is developed in human beings. Then, I discuss the way friendships can contribute to the virtue-formation process. Finally, after examining Aristotle’s theory of friendship I discuss the implications of his theory for contemporary educational settings, and I make a case for how educators might encourage moral growth in their students by helping them develop the right kinds of friends.

In this chapter, I first consider Alasdair MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian notion of “practices.” For MacIntyre, practices refer to special forms of human activity that harbor what he calls internal goods, goods to which practitioners progressively gain access as they acquire more experience. Part of what it means to enact a leisurely state of mind is to become attentive to the internal goods of our practical engagements. At the same time, the activities in which we can cultivate and enact leisure should not only be thought of as “practices,” in the MacIntyrean sense. Attending only to such practices would narrow the range of human engagement in which leisure can be experienced. More provocative is the philosopher Albert Borgmann’s  notion of a focal practice, which resonates with MacIntyre’s account, but includes a broader range of activities that count as worthwhile practices. While Borgmann’s account of focal practices covers what MacIntyre has in mind, it also includes simple activities such as cooking, walking, and reading. Borgmann shows that even, and especially in such engagements, we can experience and further cultivate leisure. Drawing from both MacIntyre’s and Borgmann’s insights, I sketch out three tangible ways to cultivate leisure.

This chapter reconstructs how temple visitors engaged with idols, and the daily lives of idols. Some Roman reliefs represent encounters with statues in terms of epiphanies, and accounts of personal interactions with idols suggest that proximity to the idol itself was desirable. Varro, Ovid, and other writers describe interactions such as anointing, adorning, cleaning, bathing, and feeding idols, suggesting they had the same needs and pleasures of a human body. The veracity of these accounts, too often dismissed by historians of ancient religion, are confirmed by finds on the floor of a temple at Thun-Allmendingen. Idols could also accept gifts, such as coins, or pieces of jewelry to add to their wardrobes, and worshipers placed these offerings as close as possible to the idol. Sometimes, idols, or representative cult images, left their temples in processions, participating in public events. After examining the concept of darshan in contemporary India, it is suggested that Roman interactions with idols are understandable if the idol was regarded as an elite member of local society, endowed with agency, who participated in the life of the community. Idols made the gods accessible by allowing worshipers to interact with them in a human way.