This chapter illustrates that envy’s ethical dimensions are varied and complex. A paradigmatic case of vicious (spiteful) envy that is both morally and prudentially bad is slowly altered. The details relevant for the normative assessment are changed, while the core psychological features are left untouched, so that in succession there is a case of envy that is morally bad but not prudentially bad (aggressive), a case of envy that is prudentially bad but not morally bad (inert), and finally a case of envy that is neither prudentially nor morally bad (emulative). Through the different variations, the emotional episode keeps satisfying all the conditions set out in the definition of envy, and thus should be recognized as such. The chapter ends by arguing that emulative envy can be a virtuous emotion, and highlighting the taxonomy’s implications for moral education.

Envy can either motivate to push oneself up to the level of the envied, or to pull the envied down to one’s own level. This leveling orientation has been explained in two ways. The first explanation focuses on the role of perceived control over the outcome: when the envier thinks they can level up, they will feel benign envy; when they think they cannot can level up, they will feel malicious envy. The second explanation is grounded in the notion of focus of concern: when the envier is concerned about the envied good, they are motivated to get it, and thus to level up; when they are concerned about their inferiority with the envied rival, they are motivated to take them down, and thus to level down. This chapter shows that these models of explanation need not be incompatible. The variables at play are independent and their intersection is responsible for the existence of four kinds of envy. It illustrates a paradigmatic case for each, providing a detailed analysis of the phenomenology, situational determinants, motivational structure, and typical behavioral outputs, and explains how they differ from nearby emotions and attitudes such as admiration, covetousness, and spite.