Many countries write their constitutions with some form of international involvement. Internationalized constitutional assistance has been made easier by technology as well as trade and political exigencies. The question, therefore, is: How does this inevitable foreign influence impact constitutional legitimacy? This article discusses this question and asserts that foreign influence interacts with three approaches of constitutional design to shape constitutional legitimacy: (a) popular participation, (b) elites’ contracts, and (c) transnational constitutional implants. Such a transactional relationship is referred to as the “three-stone legitimacy theory”, which implicates both the internal and the external legitimacy of a constitution. The former means citizens’ acceptance that a constitution meets their aspirations, while the latter refers to the international community's satisfaction with the resulting constitution as guaranteeing the universal democratic ethos. The article ends with a proposition conceptualized as a “blueprint” for a democratic constitutional legitimacy in South Sudan.

This article presents a qualitative empirical study of elite collusion and its influence on village elections and rural land development in China. Drawing on ethnographic data collected from two Chinese villages, it investigates how village cadres collude with other rural elites, using bribery, gift-giving and lavish banquets, to establish reciprocal ties with township officials and other public officials. Meanwhile, the officials make use of formal organizations to corruptly obtain profits and form alliances with village elites. The article examines how rural elites, especially village cadres, use this collusion to profit from the misuse of villagers’ collectively owned assets, the manipulation of village elections and the suppression of anti-corruption protests. It also offers new descriptive evidence of how recent reforms designed to strengthen the Party's overall leadership in rural governance may have actually facilitated elite capture and grassroots corruption.

Conservation policies have often been designed and implemented assuming that targeted communities are socially and politically homogeneous. Payment for environmental services (PES) programmes have often overlooked intra-community differences, which affect the understanding of implementation requirements and access to benefits, thus underestimating their effects on the programme's legitimacy and impacts. We explore how the views of local communities about the socio-environmental performance and dynamics of Mexico's PES differ within forest communities, considering two groups: local community authorities and the remaining beneficiaries in two different PES programmes. Informed by a nationwide survey, we constructed 35 indicators and found significant differences between these groups for 10 indicators. Local community authorities concentrated knowledge and information, relations with outside actors and control over benefit distribution. We found that community authorities and beneficiaries diverged in their views about the extent to which PES knowledge is shared across community members, how related implementation decisions are pursued and the fairness of benefit distribution, which we argue suggests this is a form of ‘elite capture’ favoured by PES design and implementation. Efforts should be invested in ensuring that PES programme benefits are equitably distributed in order to avoid widening pre-existing social and political asymmetries.

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) projects and policies often aim to improve the livelihoods of rural people who depend on natural resources, and to promote democratic decision making and equitable benefit distribution at the local level. However, a growing number of critics argue that CBNRM is susceptible to elite capture. This paper contributes to the debate on elite capture under CBNRM by studying joint forest management (JFM) in Andhra Pradesh (India) and, in particular, the case of Mohammed Nagar village. The paper addresses the following four questions: (1) How has the Indian Government formally addressed the risk of elite capture? (2) What actually happened over time when formal structures of JFM interacted with the pre-existing social structure in Mohammed Nagar? (3) When JFM results in elite capture, is this owing to the formal structures and/or the pre-existing social structure? (4) How can CBNRM be designed to avoid or minimize elite capture? Based on a reading of official government documents, the Indian Government has addressed the risk of elite capture, by ensuring representation of different social groups in the decision making bodies, regular elections, collective action in rule making and implementation, and transparency in record keeping. Nevertheless, during Mohammed Nagar's 10 years of JFM history elite capture did occur. This confirms that elite capture is a possible outcome of CBNRM. Yet, the subsequent fall of elite capture in the village also indicates that this is not necessarily a permanent outcome, and that CBNRM may in fact promote democratic and equitable resource management in the long-term. In Mohammed Nagar elite capture was largely owing to pre-existing social structures and to weaknesses in the official rules that were meant to safeguard the interests of marginalized groups. Accordingly, in CBNRM project design and implementation, pre-existing social structures' potential promotion of elite capture need to be taken into account and formal measures that might alleviate the adverse effects and/or reduce this risk must be identified.