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1 results

  • 5 - The Limits of Costly Protest

  • LaGina Gause, University of California, San Diego
  • Book:
    The Advantage of Disadvantage
    Published online:
    17 February 2022
    Print publication:
    24 February 2022, pp 120-140

  • Summary

    Gause contends that reelection incentives motivate legislators to support protest demands, especially as protesters’ resources decrease. However, how legislators respond to salient protest demands may depend on legislator or congressional district characteristics.The empirical models in the previous chapter include control variables to account for the influence of public opinion, partisanship, and legislators’ personal preferences on legislative behavior. Those empirical models provide evidence for the average legislator’s support of protesters’ preferences.

    This chapter looks more closely at a legislators’ electoral context to evaluate whether certain legislators or congressional districts misalign with the theory of costly protest and legislative behavior. The results demonstrate that all legislators are responsive to the costly protest of their constituents. A legislator’s party, race, or electoral vulnerability changes the degree but seldom the direction of legislative voting behavior in favor of low-resource protesters.