The myth of Oxford, which echoes and replicates the ideology of an unchanging world of privileged white youth, is a common trope in many films and literary works. This vision is, however, overlaid and underlaid with counter-traditions that decenter Oxford and instead insert Oxford upside down into other epistemologies, geographies, and networks. Some attempts at the transformation of elite institutions such as Oxford inadvertently serve to continue the centering of these same institutions. Coetzee argues that, instead of focusing on the histories of ascendant Black/black excellence and achievement at Oxford University, a more powerful way to relativize and decenter the institution is to document and emphasize histories and accounts of Black marginalization, failure, and disconnection.

Frames and framing make one dimension of a decision problem particularly salient. In the simplest case, frames prime responses (as in, e.g., the Asian disease paradigm, where the gain frame primes risk-aversion and the loss frame primes risk-seeking). But in more complicated situations frames can function reflectively, by making salient particular reason-giving aspects of a thing, outcome, or action. For Shakespeare's Macbeth, for example, his feudal commitments are salient in one frame, while downplayed in another in favor of his personal ambition. The role of frames in reasoning can give rise to rational framing effects. Macbeth can prefer fulfilling his feudal duty to murdering the king, while also preferring bravely taking the throne to fulfilling his feudal duty, knowing full well that bravely taking the throne just is murdering the king. Such patterns of quasi-cyclical preferences can be correct and appropriate from the normative perspective of how one ought to reason. The paper explores three less dramatic types of rational framing effects: (1) Consciously framing and reframing long-term goals and short-term temptations can be important tools for self-control. (2) In the prototypical social interactions modeled by game theory, allowing for rational framing effects solves longstanding problems, such as the equilibrium selection problem and explaining the appeal of non-equilibrium solutions (e.g., the cooperative solution in the Prisoner's Dilemma). (3) Processes for resolving interpersonal conflicts and breaking discursive deadlock, because they involve internalizing multiple and incompatible ways of framing actions and outcomes, in effect create rational framing effects.

For long decentering has been regarded as a crucial process for well-being and health. Thus, reliable measures are needed to assess decentering. This study aimed at examining the psychometric characteristics of the Portuguese version of the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ), and to contribute to gather new evidence on the role of this particular measure of decentering on the well-known relationship between rumination and depressive symptoms. The EQ factorial structure was assessed through a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) conducted in 709 participants (66% women; 34% men). CFA’ results supported a 10-item solution (χ2/df = 2.62; CFI = .96; TLI = .95; RMSEA = .05, CI = .04 to .06) with high internal consistency (α = .81), test-retest reliability (r = .86; p < .010) and construct validity. Two path analyses were further conducted in a subsample exploring the indirect effect of rumination on depression through the mechanism of decentering as assessed by the specific measure of EQ, and by the non-specific measure of decentering TMS. Decentering, only when measured by EQ, significantly emerged as a mechanism through which the relationship between rumination and depressive symptoms also operates (R 2 = .22). Findings highlight the importance of using EQ as a specific measure of this transdiagnostic process in research and clinical settings.