This research evaluates whether the introduction of countercyclical payments creates an incentive for program crop producers to hedge the expected government payment using futures and/or options. Results indicate that some level of countercyclical payment hedging is optimal for risk-averse decision makers. However, optimal hedge ratios depend on planting time expectations of marketing year average price as well as on what crop, if any, has been planted on countercyclical payment base acres. These results suggest that the ability to hedge may make these payments more decoupled but also illustrate the distortion of producer behavior induced by farm programs.

Changes to commodity programs in the 2002 Farm Bill increased the value of crop base acreages on which decoupled payments are received. The bill also expanded the availability of key conservation programs. This paper compares the value of payments from commodity programs (along with continued crop production) to the easement payment (and recreational lease revenue) available under the Wetland Reserve Program. A net present value model using risk-adjusted returns is employed in the analysis for Mississippi delta cropland containing rice, cotton, and soybean base. Sensitivity analysis is conducted on some of the key variables affecting the decision.