One philosophical approach that directly responds to the problem of induction is falsificationism, first proposed by Karl Popper. This chapter examines how falsificationists propose to account for the growth of scientific knowledge without appealing to inductive reasoning. Their approach relies on attempts to falsify general hypotheses through experiments and observations. Additional logical concepts are introduced in this chapter to facilitate the logical analysis of such falsification. The concept of corroboration, central to the falsificationist view, is introduced. The apparatus of falsificationism is applied to the example of Newton’s optical experiments introduced in Chapter 1. Finally, falsificationism is discussed in relation to conventionalism, a philosophical idea that in some ways falsificationism attacks and in other ways exemplifies.

This chapter completes our critical exploration of Popper’s key work, the Logic of Scientific Discovery and how it applies to corpus linguistics. In this chapter we address the question of how easily linguistics may be viewed as a science, in Popper’s terms. We also consider important critiques of Popper’s work and use those to both clarify and, where necessary, adapt the framework.