Chapter Five examines the role of international law in State Department policymaking. It describes the formal and informal decision-making processes within the State Department, focusing on the influential role of the Legal Adviser and the Legal Adviser’s Office. The chapter then examines closely the weight given by policymakers to legal advice and the nature of the interaction between policymakers and lawyers. Policymakers, at least at higher levels, generally have final decision-making authority, but the views of the Legal Adviser’s Office can be determinative in the relatively rare instances when the lawyers deem a course of action conclusively illegal. Otherwise, the lawyers’ advice is influential, but its weight may vary depending on the circumstances, including the nature of the national interest involved. Many former officials indicated that the development of policy was often a collaborative and constructive process. The lawyers were usually willing to work with policymakers, and they were often willing to find alternative courses of action within the law, though they would not usually budge on an interpretation of the law. Some former officials indicated that their relationship involved greater contestation, resembling a negotiation. When international law conflicted with significant policy interests, policymakers could sometimes seek to overcome those obstacles.

Over the past three decades norms research has become a subfield that matters beyond the boundaries of International Relations (IR). Like other such generative processes this subfield’s path is marked by debates over conceptual and methodological preferences. This book argues that irrespective of how we understand these divides, the critical question for today’s norms researchers is how have our understandings of norms developed over this period? To address this question this book brings together a range of junior, mid-career, and senior scholars, working at the leading edge of norm research, across a diversity of issues and subfields, and using different epistemological perspectives. Two lenses feature in this endeavour: the first considers the history of norm research as a series of three distinct and theoretical moves, and the second examines the potential of practices of interpretation and contestation (which we term the ‘interpretation-contestation framework’) as a way of bringing together a range of theoretical tools to understand norm change, evolution, and replacement. In short, this book focuses on the past trajectory of the field to argue that norm research continues to hold significant potential and promise for theorising within IR and studying current issues and problems.

Over the past two decades, we have seen a significant shift in the norms literature away from the idea that a norm reflects a fixed and universally accepted shared understanding to notions that any norm – even those which appear to be widely institutionalised in international organisations of global governance – remains subject to contestation and interpretation at multiple sites in world politics. In this chapter, we take up the challenge of studying these diverse types of norms and their meaning, use, and role in practice. We begin by returning to the three moves laid out in the introduction and use as a vignette the forced landing of Ryanair Flight 4978 in Belarus in May 2021 to explore how each of these three moves can explain these events. We then draw out three sets of conclusions from the book, focusing on the process of contestation. We end by noting that the distinct approaches to norm research developed over the past thirty years do speak to one another in meaningful and innovative ways. By focusing on contestation in a holistic way, we can not only understand norms in a unique way but also how they constitute the world.

In Chapter 2 I propose reconceptualising the ‘CoE system’ from one traditionally seen as a hierarchy of autonomous institutions towards an understanding of a matrix of mutually reinforcing judicial and non-judicial components for which Member States have collective responsibility. I argue that a whole-of-system approach is especially important when faced with systemic problems of such complexity. I then offer a high-level snapshot of current examples which exist in Eastern Europe (Transnistria and currently occupied parts of Ukraine), the South Caucasus (the Karabakh region/Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and the Eastern Mediterranean (Northern Cyprus).

Among the rhetorical pleas that follow most instances of public dissatisfaction is the call for more or better accountability. Accountability is a lauded notion, a “golden concept” that is considered widely as critical to the success of democratic government. Such pleas, I will argue, are misplaced. Rather than starting from the premise of accountability as an idea that no one can be against, I consider the possibility that accountability undermines the very notion it ostensibly promotes: self-government. The concept of accountability in modern political theory is tied more closely to the emergence of an impersonal administrative state than it is to the hopeful horizon of a democratic one. In practice and in theory, it is a concept of irresponsibility, a technological approach to government that provides the comforts of impersonal rationality.

This chapter investigates legal accountability of financial assistance from the perspective of borrower countries. It adopts an empirical approach taking the Portuguese case to test how accountability of the financial assistance programme, on the one hand, and of the national measures implementing conditionality, on the other, was exercised. The investigation focuses on the judicial review of austerity measures in different institutional contexts comprising the domestic constitutional court, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights. It aims at assessing in how far these judicial fora have delivered the accountability goods identified in the introductory chapter, particularly publicness, as the good oriented towards ensuring that public action is guided by common goods, namely that it respects the constitutional principles of equality and proportionality.

Frontline crisis teams are typically very cohesive, characterized by strong bonds between members. Cohesion ensures that team members look out for each other in dangerous work environments, operate resiliently in crisis contexts, and can rapidly coordinate in stressful situations. This explains why many crisis organizations are total institutions. Yet, cohesion may also produce dysfunctional group dynamics, as open debate about the crisis and the required response is avoided. Contestation in crisis teams is often deplored and might escalate into conflict, but it does ensure a thorough analysis of the situation from diverse viewpoints and thus facilitates the adoption of a well-considered, mindful response. The simultaneous need for cohesion and contestation creates a dilemma. To deal with this dilemma, it is important to note that team tensions are varied. Crisis organizations, particularly those with complex tasks, can pursue task-related contestation, while upholding relationship-related cohesion. This requires an investment in mutual trust and respect, so that team develops a safe space for open interactions without risking hostility or disintegration.

This chapter highlights the strong relationship between dialogue and political moderation by drawing on the ideas of J. S. Mill’s On Liberty (1859). It makes a plea for cultivating the civil art of disagreement that is vital to our free and democratic way of life.

International law (IL) draws its legitimacy and authority from public affirmations and diffuse support for the rule of law, yet contestation about IL is to be expected. States collectively rule and contest international politics through the crafting, invocation, and interpretation of IL. The chapter explores both ordinary and extraordinary contestations of IL authority. Ordinary contestation takes place within a legal field, when lawyers, stakeholders, judges, and government officials debate, contest, and disagree about the meaning of IL. Political tactics are also part of ordinary contestation, but because the curators of IL authority are transnational, a state may be unable to impose its preferred IL interpretation. Instead, states can use three extra-ordinary contestation strategies to escape IL authority: they can 1) seek to replace international law’s authority with domestic law’s authority; 2) pit different international laws against each other by maneuvering within and around international regime complexes; and (3) attack the legitimacy and authority of international law altogether. Extraordinary contestation can make IL more accountable, but it can also undermine the permissive conditions that make IL both constraining and effective.

Finally, the conclusion provides an overview of the argument and findings, which together call for a departure from the more traditional narrative around the governance gap. Instead, this research illustrates that while impunity does exist, there are many more efforts to hold corporations accountable than the governance gap narrative would suggest. The varieties of remedy approach focus on the real shortcomings associated with governing – the abilities to engage with an adversary, absorb contestation, and explore creative and possibly unorthodox solutions to find a better path forward. This chapter also addresses the generalizability of this work and shares some areas of future research.

Engaging directly with agonistic thought, Chapter 6 asks whether contestation about corporate human rights abuses, over the long-term, shapes democratic institutions more broadly. What is clear in agonistic scholarship is that confrontation must be incorporated or integrated into democratic institutions. This chapter empirically tests this relationship. It finds that contestation improves measures of respect for human rights and civic empowerment. That is, without any formal or informal response, simply speaking out and making abuses known improves respect for human rights, generally. The data also illustrate that, regardless of the outcome, there is a positive cumulative effect of trials over time, demonstrating the importance of reflexive innovation. In contrast, simply engaging in non-judicial remedy alone does not improve respect for human rights. The analysis shows that there is a positive, cumulative relationship between respect for human rights and those non-judicial remedy efforts led by the state. If corporations lead the non-judicial remedy effort, however, they do nothing to improve respect for human rights or more robust civic engagement over the long-term.

The chapter focuses on how IIAs have impacted relations in public administrations through institutional rearrangements. First, we analyse how the intervention of IIAs influenced relations between different state agencies at the central level. Here, we look mainly at central state agencies’ struggles over the IIA portfolio and the attendant budgetary repercussions. Second, we look at how the IIAs impact the relations between the central agencies and their counterparts at the levels of individual states, provinces, and municipalities. This part deals with the management of the support for foreign investment projects and issues connected with ISDS management and defence. We highlight the related budgetary politics as well. Regardless of the variations, one element arises from all of the studied states: the gradual side-lining of the traditional actors tasked with international diplomacy in favour of more sectoral expert actors that base their expertise on the considerations of trade, commerce, finance, and the economy. It also became evident that the practices of centralisation, executive rule, and discourses that put a premium on the economic considerations of efficiency and competition have been preferred by the centre to rein in provinces.

The pervasive informal privatization of public institutions seen in urban secondary schooling is a key component of the lived citizenship of different social strata. Many of the arguments in the book depend on an appreciation of the implications of pervasive private tutoring for the everyday school and for articulations of citizenship and national belonging among students. Privatization-by-tutoring affects almost every aspect of school life in Egypt, from whether students and teachers come to school or enter classrooms to whether the morning assembly ritual is performed. It is, however, the different ways in which informal tutoring markets are established within and alongside formal institutions in the three types of school that reflect the functioning of state institutions and differentiated modes of lived and imagined citizenship. The chapter dissects the trajectories, functioning and implications of informal privatization in different tiers of schooling. It explains enrollment in tutoring, its costs, the related forms of coercion, cheating, truancy, narratives of conscientious teachers and tropes of neoliberal subjectivity.

This chapter explores the conditions under which global elites are influential in shaping citizens’ legitimacy beliefs toward global governance. It distinguishes between member governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations as three sets of global elites, evaluates whether these elites impact legitimacy beliefs through their communication, and identifies the conditions under which such communication is more successful. The chapter examines theoretical expectations comparatively across five prominent global or regional international organizations, including the European Union, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations. At the heart of the empirical investigation is a survey-embedded experiment in three countries (Germany, the UK, and the US). The analysis shows that communication by more credible elites (member governments and NGOs) has stronger effects on citizens’ legitimacy perceptions than communication by less credible elites (international organizations themselves).

This chapter focuses on domestic elites and examines the conditions under which political parties influence public perceptions of international organization legitimacy. While it is well-known that political parties are powerful communicators about domestic political matters, less is known about the effects of party cues on global political issues. The chapter explores this topic based on two survey experiments on party communication regarding two international organizations (North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United Nations). The experiments are embedded in surveys conducted in two countries (Germany and the US), which vary in the degree of political polarization. The chapter finds that party cues tend to shape legitimacy beliefs toward NATO and the UN in the highly polarized US setting, while few effects are detected in the less polarized German context.