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  • 11 - Achieving Accountability: Aligning Institutions and Behavior

  • from Part III - Policymaking, Information Provision, and Accountability
  • Edited by Charles M. Cameron, Princeton University, New Jersey, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Stanford University, California, Sanford C. Gordon, New York University, Gregory A. Huber, Yale University, Connecticut
  • Book:
    Accountability Reconsidered
    Published online:
    09 February 2023
    Print publication:
    16 February 2023, pp 242-262

  • Summary

    In Chapter 11, John Patty draws on recent developments in behavioral economics to consider how political overseers, such as congressional oversight committees or agency heads, can deal with the extraordinary complexity of their job. Modern political organizations are composed of a hoard of individuals making innumerable choices, so how can overseers make sense of it? Patty introduces the concept of bracketing – how principals and agents group choices to compare among them when contemplating actions. Bracketing can affect how principals such as congressional members evaluate the consequences of bureaucratic behavior, the flow of evaluative information available to such principals, and the incentives for government officials to allocate or misallocate their efforts. Patty discusses how bracketing may influence features of institutional design, centralization of authority, and specialization. Additionally, bracketing has implications for policy evaluation and planning.