This chapter deals with the pursuit of public interests in the context of privatisation and sales of public property. It identifies the various interests involved and sets out the relevant EU legal framework for this domain. On the basis of this, the chapter addresses the question of whether the sale should be carried out through competitive tendering, given that it might be possible to apply alternative – and still legitimate – systems to achieve the sale. In answering this question, the chapter assumes that State aid rules identify the market economy operator principle as the cornerstone around which the allocation procedure must revolve. Hence, the question from an EU law viewpoint becomes: does competitive tendering only ensure compliance with the market economy vendor principle (MEVP) test or are there other methods to achieve the same result? On the basis of the outcome of the analysis, the chapter assesses which public interests can be pursued and which transaction system better pursues which type of public interest.

This introductory chapter explains the need for adopting an overarching perspective to the allocation of limited rights. Although the applicable legal frameworks may suggest otherwise, the awards of public contracts, authorisations, subsidies or government sales share common characteristics in the event that the number of rights available for grant is limited. These similarities are nowhere as manifest as with regard to the question of whether governments should use some form of competitive tendering when allocating these ‘limited rights’. Although the public interests involved in the allocation of these limited rights differ in substance and respective weight, competitive procedures should aim to optimise the pursuit of the different public interests involved. Using Mark Moore’s theory of creating and recognising public value, this chapter provides a general reflection upon the distinct role of the legal framework for allocating governments in solving this optimisation problem.