Third party funding has long been recognised in several Western jurisdictions as an effective risk management tool that can curb the potential losses and soaring costs associated with large and complex judicial and arbitral proceedings.This is particularly true of investment arbitration which has seen a steady escalation in the quantum of claims and the costs of protracted proceedings over more complex disputes.The year 2017 marked a turning point in Asia through carefully crafted legislation for the financing of legal claims by third party funders in Hong Kong and Singapore.This chapter gives a practical overview of the legislation in both jurisdictions and its intended impact on the legal landscape.The consequential amendments to secondary rules within these jurisdictions are analysed, with a particular focus on Hong Kong and its position to mainland China.Practical considerations as to whether this change in the industry augurs well for the eventual extension of the practice beyond the realm of arbitration are also covered.Finally, several ethical issues are addressed that will feature in the operation of third-party funding in these jurisdictions such as disclosure, control and cost implications.

Lessons from Minamata, Seveso, Bhopal and other cases of corporate chemical negligence. Attempts to corrupt the political process. Climate denial linked to chemical denial. The ‘dirty dozen’ supertoxics. Offshoring of toxics industry to unregulated countries. Chemical codes, guidelines and the failure of regulation. Who is really responsible? How the consumer drives chemical demand.

This chapter concludes and provides recommendations for the better integration of the judicial and private mechanisms discussed in previous chapters so that they deliver fairer, clearer, more predictable and UNDRIP-compliant outcomes for indigenous communities. National laws must recognise the special vulnerability of land-connected people to development projects and impose a moratorium on land disturbance until a developer has undertaken a preventative conflict assessment. That assessment must take no longer than state divestment of land and must necessitate a mediation process which interfaces with the layers of race, ethnicity, legacy and postcolonial histories that can relate to land. This chapter considers what this process entails (including the requirement for the legal ability of communities to say no at this point) and methods for dealing with the cost and independence of such a process (blind trusts). Aspects of this assessment could, through a code of practice, then feed into project governance much further upstream and tighten existing documentation at the specific points at which indigenous vulnerability to dispossession is high, as detailed. Other suggestions on institutional culture are made.