Every civil wrong has a number of requirements that must be satisfied before the plaintiff may obtain compensation for resulting harm. One requirement common to all wrongs is that the harm must be attributable to the defendant’s wrongful conduct. It may broadly be said that the defendant’s wrongful conduct must constitute a cause of the harm. This always involves an inquiry into whether there is a historical link in fact between the wrong and the harm, and usually also a value judgement on whether liability for the harm ought to be imposed upon the defendant.

With regard to wrongs actionable only on proof of damage (for example, negligence), the attribution of responsibility for harm is part of establishing liability rather than a matter of remedy. With regard to wrongs actionable per se, the attribution of responsibility for harm is a matter of remedy since nominal damages can be awarded in the absence of loss. In any event, it is customary to discuss attribution of responsibility in books on remedies, and this book follows that custom.

Before a plaintiff can obtain compensation for harm suffered due to any wrong, they need to attribute the harm to the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Broadly, the defendant’s conduct must be a cause of the harm. There is usually a double inquiry here – first, into whether there was a factual historical link between the wrong and the harm (‘factual causation’) and second, a value judgment on whether liability for the harm ought to be imposed upon the defendant (‘legal causation’ or ‘scope of liability’).

Attributing responsibility is sometimes part of establishing liability (for example, for wrongs actionable only on proof of damage, such as negligence), but for wrongs which are actionable per se, it is a matter of remedy.

While the rules on attribution of liability are not the same for every wrong, there are significant similarities. The cases detailed in this chapter illustrate key commonalities and differences across the various wrongs in the rules governing attribution of responsibility. More detail of the specific rules used to attribute responsibility for the individual wrongs is found in the specific chapters on those wrongs.

Physical Eliminativism – the view that the only facts there are, are fundamental physical facts – is not implied by our reductive practices, as I argue in Chapter 7. The positive picture that emerges is one that can be characterised in terms of ‘ontological monism’ and ‘descriptive pluralism’: It allows for a plurality of descriptions of a system, e.g., on a micro- and on a macro-level, none of which is ontologically privileged as the exclusively true account of reality, provided they are empirically adequate.