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This chapter uses qualitative and quantitative evidence to demonstrate that internal strife among the Peronist Party’s candidates was crucial in Cambiemos’ rise to power in Argentina in 2015. These divisions even paved the way for Cambiemos to secure the executive positions in eleven of the thirty-three municipalities in the Conurbano Bonaerense, a traditional Peronist stronghold. Peronist infighting benefited Cambiemos in two ways: First, it weakened the electoral competitiveness of Peronist mayoral candidates; second, it left defeated Peronist brokers from the primaries available for recruitment by the opposition. Cambiemos’ local candidates capitalized on this opportunity, building their own networks to challenge Peronist candidates in poor municipalities.
The commodification of brokers and intense Peronist infighting created a window of opportunity for Cambiemos candidates to build their own networks, challenging the Peronist monopoly over broker networks in vulnerable areas. This chapter employs ethnographic research to illustrate how Cambiemos mayors recruited brokers. Drawing on in-depth interviews with mayors and brokers in four Conurbano Bonaerense municipalities – Lanús, Pilar, Quilmes, and Tres de Febrero – it provides a unique account of how these new networks were established over time. The chapter details how mayors recruited militants from Cambiemos allies, disenchanted Peronist brokers, and community leaders who previously had no political experience, thereby strengthening their local networks.
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