In Chapter 2, we continue our historical discussion of mechanistic explanation. The chief purpose of this chapter is to disentangle what we call mechanical and quasi-mechanical mechanism and point to the key problems they face. We begin by offering an outline of the mechanical conception of mechanism, as this was developed after the seventeenth century. We then present Henri Poincaré’s critique of mechanical mechanism in relation to the principle of conservation of energy. The gist of this critique is that mechanical mechanisms are too easy to get to be informative, provided that energy is conserved. We then motivate the quasi-mechanical conception of mechanism and reconstruct G. W. F. Hegel’s critique of the idea of quasi-mechanism, as this was developed in his Science of Logic. Hegel’s problem, in essence, was that the unity that mechanisms possess is external to them and that the very idea that all explanation is mechanical is devoid of content. Finally, we bring together Poincaré’s problem and Hegel’s problem and argue that though mechanisms are not the building blocks of nature, the search for mechanism is epistemologically and methodologically welcome.

The absence of ISDS cases against China may mean that investors are deprived of adequate and effective remedies for resolving investment disputes. Based on [type of empirical research], the authors find support for the view that the procedures offered by Chinese IIAs and legislation promote dispute resolution that is mutually satisfactory among investors and closely related public officials. However, they also find a possible trade-off in the sense that such solutions might depend on and promote corruption. Against this background, they explore how ISDS could contribute to combating corruption. [Abstract needs to be filled out and follow a logic of legitimacy critique, research method, finding/caveats – not currently clear]