In this text, of which we have translated a large excerpt, Henry of Ghent rejects the view defended by Albert and Aquinas according to which powers are accidents distinct from the essence of the soul. Instead, he maintains, the soul is its powers “through its essence”. To show this, Henry devises an argument directed against Aquinas’ claim that a power must be in the same category as its act. The upshot of the argument is that this claim must be rejected because, along with some premises widely accepted by medieval Aristotelians, it leads to a (vicious) infinite regress. Additionally, Henry develops his own theory of the powers of the soul. While he thinks that the soul is its powers through its essence, he contends that the soul’s powers do add something to the soul, namely, relations to their acts. For example, the intellect is the soul as related to the act of thinking, whereas sight is the soul as related to the act of seeing. On the basis of this relational account Henry discusses in this text the distinction between those powers of the soul that are tied to a bodily organ, such as sight, and those that are not, such as the intellect.