Although the priority heuristic (PH) is conceived as a cognitive-process model, some of its critical process assumptions remain to be tested. The PH makes very strong ordinal and quantitative assumptions about the strictly sequential, non-compensatory use of three cues in choices between lotteries: (1) the difference between worst outcomes, (2) the difference in worst-case probabilities, and (3) the best outcome that can be obtained. These aspects were manipulated orthogonally in the present experiment. No support was found for the PH. Although the main effect of the primary worst-outcome manipulation was significant, it came along with other effects that the PH excludes. A strong effect of the secondary manipulation of worst-outcome probabilities was not confined to small differences in worst-outcomes; it was actually stronger for large worst-outcome differences. Overall winning probabilities that the PH ignores exerted a systematic influence. The overall rate of choices correctly predicted by the PH was close to chance, although high inter-judge agreement reflected systematic responding. These findings raise fundamental questions about the theoretical status of heuristics as fixed modules.

Scholars often assume that reference groups are industry-wide, homogeneous, and stable. We examine this assumption and suggest hypotheses based on managers’ motivations such as self-enhancement and self-improvement, social identity, and affiliation-based impression management. We test hypotheses on failure-induced changes in reference groups and their direction in terms of upward and downward comparisons. An empirical examination of changes in reference groups for firms listed on the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index between 1993 and 2008 shows that performance below social aspirations induces changes in reference groups and toward upward comparisons. The results indicate that managers can choose to change the reference group – a cognition-centered response – as an alternative to such action-centered responses as organizational search and risk-taking in response to poor performance from social aspirations and that upward comparisons may be the result of social performance shortfalls to give a better impression and to improve firm performance.

Transformation is a vital challenge for Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs) and their top managers. To explore this increasingly important topic,we first summarize the institutional context of SOE transformation and theconflicting interests and interdependent relationships of six major actorsas inside/outside stakeholders. Based on the strategic action view ofinstitutional analysis, we emphasize the role of the change agent's level ofaspiration and political skills in transforming an SOE. Then, throughinductive case studies on the transformation of three SOEs, we address howtop managers, acting as change agents, can initiate and engage ininstitutional change through strategic actions such as negotiation,manipulation, and coercion; we also illustrate how they adopt differentactions to influence different actors. Based on the inductive results, wedevelop a theoretical model, which we refer to as the ‘strategic actionmodel’ that shows how the aspiration level, political skills, strategicactions, and change outcomes interrelate and offer insights into thestrategic action of top managers as change agents. Our most importantcontribution is revealing the interplay between the proactive role of insideactors as change agents and the enabling condition of institutionalcontext.

This study focuses on firms’ search behavior with regard to corporate R&D investment. Building on Cyert and March's (1963) behavioral theory of the firm, we develop specific hypotheses about how firms adjust their R&D investment in response to performance discrepancies, and how this adjustment varies for two types of slack resources. Moreover, by utilizing institutional logic, we also hypothesized that the firms’ search behaviors in response to performance feedback may differ between business-group affiliated and unaffiliated firms. Empirical evidence from panel data coving 274 Taiwanese electronics firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period 1999–2008 is consistent with our theoretical predictions. In particular, we find that firms will increase R&D investment when they faced discrepancies in performance, but will decrease R&D spending when close to bankruptcy. Moreover, our results show that unabsorbed and absorbed slack have different impacts, positively and negatively affecting R&D investment, respectively. In addition, we find that both business group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms will increase R&D investment in response to negative performance feedback, but only business group-affiliated firms will increase R&D activity when facing positive performance feedback. Furthermore, we also find that only business group-affiliated firms have a greater inclination to invest in R&D when there is unabsorbed slack. Our findings extend the claims of behavioral theory in newly industrialized economies, and identify the important factors that need to be considered in future studies.