This Article sheds new light on the long-running debate in EU legal studies about how intense the EU judicial review of complex and uncertain assessments requiring specialist knowledge could and should be. It argues that it is necessary to move beyond formulas and concepts hammered out in the judicial statements of reasons and consider how the institutional context affects legal epistemology. How likely is it that the judges form an independent opinion about the probative value of the presented evidence and the soundness of the administration’s specialist reasoning? How likely is it that their opinion is reliable? Answering these questions helps appraise the boundaries in which judicial review or proliferating administrative review by partly specialised boards of appeal foster the rule of law understood as the pursuit of non-arbitrariness. The Article examines recent case law of the EU Courts and the Board of Appeal of the European Chemical Agency concerning public health and environmental issues, in which complex and uncertain specialist assessments were prevalent. It contends that, due to institutional limitations of EU adjudicatory bodies, a further expansion of the rule of law in EU decision-making requiring specialist knowledge should be pursued through extra-judicial means fostering transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability.

As the result of the initiation of the ‘judicial reform’ in January 2023, and the huge wave of public protest, Israel is currently undergoing a political turmoil which may develop into a fully fledged constitutional crisis. In this article I provide an account of the roots and causes of the present crisis from a public law theory perspective. In particular, I discuss the relationship between constitutional and administrative law in Israeli law. I argue that the core of Israel's constitutional structure has always been the institutions of administrative law as created and developed during the ‘administrative revolution’ of the 1980s. In contrast, Israel's constitutional law has always been a peripheral in the core structure of judicial review over the political branches. Contrary to common wisdom, I argue that the ‘constitutional revolution’ of the mid-1990s has not changed this core structure, but rather provided an external belt of normative barricades for this core structure. Accordingly, and despite the pretentious constitutional discourse developed in the 1990s by the Court, Israel was and still is a monistic democracy with no true constitutional layer of norms that enjoys higher status vis-à-vis regular legislation.