I examine two related arguments for the claim that if God is omnipotent, God cannot lack abilities such as the ability to do evil or to act irrationally. Both arguments concern the idea that omnipotence is inconsistent with being dominated with respect to abilities. I raise new issues in the formulation of such dominance principles about ability, and attempt to solve them. I also discuss and reject existing objections to these arguments. I conclude that these arguments are promising but not conclusive, and that important work remains to be done in formulating the relevant dominance principles.

Can we hold agents responsible for their implicitly biased behavior? The aim of this text is to show that, from the nurturing stance, holding subjects responsible for their implicitly biased behavior is justified, even though they are not blameworthy. First, I will introduce the nurturing stance as Daphne Brandenburg originally developed it. Second, I will specify what holding somebody responsible from the nurturing stance amounts to. Third, I show how and why holding responsible can help a subject develop an impaired capacity. Fourth, I analyze empirical data about holding prejudiced subjects responsible and highlight that the internal motivation to control prejudiced reactions decreases implicit attitudes’ influences. Furthermore, the data show that in order to be appropriate moral demands have to acknowledge the target's autonomy and competence. In sum, from the nurturing stance, holding implicitly biased subjects responsible is appropriate if they can adequately respond to the moral demands.

Tacit knowing as a concept and legitimate topic of scholarship came up in philosophical research in the second half of the 20th century in the form of some influential works by Michael Polanyi (although similar concepts had been discussed before). Systematic epistemological studies on the topic are still scarce, however. In this article, I support the thesis that tacit knowing pervades all our common major divisions of knowledge and that it therefore must not be neglected in epistemological research. By this approach I am simultaneously giving a systematic back-up for Polanyi's claim that the tacit component is found in all knowledge.

This paper warns of two threats to moral responsibility that arise when accounting for omissions, given some plausible assumptions about how abilities are related to responsibility. The first problem threatens the legitimacy of our being responsible by expanding the preexisting tension that luck famously raises for moral responsibility. The second threat to moral responsibility challenges the legitimacy of our practices of holding responsible. Holding others responsible for their omissions requires us to bridge an epistemic gap that does not arise when holding others responsible for their actions—one that we might often fail to cross.

This paper analyzes whether herding and skillful managers may coexist. When herding appears, managers tend to present poor timing abilities; however, a weak herding level (a result commonly found in pension funds) may evidence a mixed scenario, where some managers develop skills, and others follow the herd. Additionally, when informational cascades emerge, some managers may act as leaders, anticipating others’ movements. Nonetheless, this anticipatory skill does not mean that leaders also anticipate market movements and present timing skills. Our results show herding and inter-temporal herding in a sample of Spanish pension funds, though the imitation behavior is not strong. We also find evidence of a mixed scenario, in which some non-herding managers present timing skills, while herding funds are not able to develop these abilities. Finally, we find successful timing for certain leaders, showing that the anticipation of others’ movements does not show real timing abilities.

This paper reviews the use of video games for measuring intelligence differences and reports two studies analyzing the relationship between intelligence and performance on a leisure video game. In the first study, the main focus was to design an Intelligence Test using puzzles from the video game. Forty-seven young participants played “Professor Layton and the curious village”® for a maximum of 15 hours and completed a set of intelligence standardized tests. Results show that the time required for completing the game interacts with intelligence differences: the higher the intelligence, the lower the time (d = .91). Furthermore, a set of 41 puzzles showed excellent psychometric properties. The second study, done seven years later, confirmed the previous findings. We finally discuss the pros and cons of video games as tools for measuring cognitive abilities with commercial video games, underscoring that psychologists must develop their own intelligence video games and delineate their key features for the measurement devices of next generation.

This article sketches a subtheory of human intelligence based on the component construct. Components differ in their levels of generality and in their functions. Metacomponents are higher-order control process used for planning how a problem should be solved, for making decisions regarding alternative courses of action during problem solving, and for monitoring solution processes. Performance components are processes used in the execution of a problem-solving strategy. Acquisition components are processes used in learning new information. Retention components are processes used in retrieving previously stored knowledge. Transfer components are used in generalization, that is, in carrying over knowledge from one task or task context to another. A mechanism for the interaction among components of different kinds and multiple components of the same kind can account for certain interesting aspects of laboratory and everyday problem solving. A brief historical overview of alternative basic units for understanding intelligence is followed by a detailed description of one of these units, the component and by a differentiation among various kinds of components. Examples of each kind of component are given, and the use of each of these components in a problem-solving situation is illustrated. Then, a system of interrelations among the various kinds of components is described. Finally, the functions of components in human intelligence are assessed by considering how the proposed subtheory can account for various empirical phenomena in the literature on human intelligence.

This article is a synopsis of a triarchic theory of human intelligence. The theory comprises three subtheories: a contextual subtheory, which relates intelligence to the external world of the individual; a componential subtheory, which relates intelligence to the individual's internal world; and a two-facet subtheory, which relates intelligence to both the external and internal worlds. The contextual subtheory defines intelligent behavior in terms of purposive adaptation to, shaping of, and selection of real-world environments relevant to one's life. The normal course of intelligent functioning in the everyday world entails adaptation to the environment; when the environment does not fit one's values, aptitudes, or interests, one may attempt to shape the environment so as to achieve a better person-environment fit; when shaping fails, an attempt may be made to select a new environment that provides a better fit. The two-facet subtheory further constrains this definition by regarding as most relevant to the demonstration of intelligence contextually intelligent behavior that involves either adaptation to novelty, automatization of information processing, or both. Efficacious automatization of processing allows allocation of additional resources to the processing of novelty in the environment; conversely, efficacious adaptation to novelty allows automatization to occur earlier in one's experience with new tasks and situations. The componential subtheory specifies the mental mechanisms responsible for the learning, planning, execution, and evaluation of intelligent behavior. Metacomponents of intelligence control one's information processing and enable one to monitor and later evaluate it; performance components execute the plans constructed by the metacomponents; knowledge-acquisition components selectively encode and combine new information and selectively compare new information to old so as to allow new information to be learned.