How should we best characterise the UK party system in the wake of nearly a decade and a half of Conservative government? Has it undergone a significant and enduring realignment, or merely amounted to passing turbulence, after which things have returned to the seemingly eternal verities of stable two-party competition? The question for us to consider in this chapter is whether we can regard the period since 2010 in such terms: in particular, does the general election of December 2019 constitute a moment of critical realignment? Or is it more sensible to view this as the mere culmination of a relatively prolonged period of Conservative Party ascendancy based on a regular swing of the electoral pendulum – a swing which will inevitably reverse itself as the centre of electoral gravity shifts in favour of Labour once more? In other words, a simple affirmation of the age-old dynamics of the two-party system.

International pressures, Brexit and the resurgence of nationalism have created new divides in the regions of the United Kingdom. Brendan O’Leary examines the impact of Conservative policy in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales, focusing on how prime ministers have handled campaigns and support for Scottish independence, the ruling coalitions in Wales, and also the new post-Brexit framework and demographic pressures in Northern Ireland. The chapter ends with a dire overall evaluation of the condition of the union as a result of Conservative policy.

A sustained period of Conservative government would normally be expected to usher in constitutional stability. But the reverse was largely true for the period 2010-24. During these years constitutional controversies were rarely far from the news, partly thanks to deliberately planned changes, but mostly due to radically shifting conventions and political behaviour. Across the time period, the direction of change was also very far from consistent. The initial coalition years were marked primarily by pressures towards greater constitutional pluralism, though Liberal Democrat reform ambitions were often held back by Cameron’s Conservatives. Later, any prospect of calm under single-party government was soon punctured by the pressures of Brexit. This eventually brought into question almost every aspect of the UK’s constitutional arrangements, and inflicted painful splits within the Conservative Party over questions of governance. In particular, Boris Johnson’s populist approach was characterised by wholesale disregard for constitutional norms, and highlighted vulnerabilities in the UK’s key democratic arrangements which few would previously have anticipated. If one commonality can be discerned across this fourteen-year period of constitutional extremes, it is the largely unconservative nature of policy.

In this chapter, we examine the almost uniquely powerful position the British prime minister is in compared to heads of government abroad, and the long list of the PM’s powers and resources. With so much in their favour, why is their performance often so underwhelming? Premierships can go by in a blur of frenzied activity. Prime ministers typically only reflect fully on the powers and resources they possessed after their period in office is over, when they are writing their memoirs, ruefully reflecting on what might have been. That doesn’t mean that there aren’t precise powers, some formal, others informal, accumulated over the years, and it is these that we consider in this chapter. The most successful prime ministers, like Thatcher or Attlee, knew, by study or osmosis, how to use them.

Scottish constitutional history has become a subject of much interest in recent decades. Since the Union came into force in May 1707, Scotland has been one component of a complex and dynamic state. The Union itself has been described as an ‘enigma’ that defies easy or conventional definitions.1 Britain is simultaneously ‘unitary’, in the sense that sovereign power, to this day, rests with the ‘crown-in-parliament’ at Westminster, and ‘pluralistic’, because the Treaty continues to guarantee Scotland (more than Wales and Northern Ireland) considerable autonomy in civil affairs.2 In this respect, the establishment of a Scottish parliament in 1999 is simply the belated democratisation of what has always been a distinct ‘national’ politics. It has also (re)kindled debates on Scotland’s possible constitutional futures and this has included reflection on Scotland’s pre-Union heritage. These debates were aided by the creation of an accessible online edition of the records of the Scottish parliament to 1707.3 The renewed interest in Scottish parliamentary history has complemented endeavours in the field of political thought, where attention has focused on the centrality of kingship to Renaissance and early modern discourses. Certain questions have been thrown into sharper relief as a consequence of these inter-related developments. How did abstracted conceptualisations of the political community inform the ways in which people engaged with its governing and representative institutions? How were the boundaries of legitimate political action negotiated and renegotiated over time? To what principles were political actors expected to conform and what happened when those principles were challenged?

Chapter 2 focuses on who service magicians were. As with Chapter 1, there is an element of statistical analysis as we endeavour to ascertain who a ‘typical’ service magician might be. The broad conclusion reached is that service magicians were diverse in terms of gender, occupation, and, as far as we can tell, age, though if the demographics are broken down by type of magic practised, some patterns do emerge. The second section of this chapter looks at the economics of magic: in short, how it worked as a service, and what sort of income a magician might expect. In doing so, we learn something of the financial state of sorcerers. The chapter concludes with a case study of Westminster, through which it is possible to gain an idea of how magic sat alongside other trades in a microcosmic service economy.

Britain has a partly decentralised arrangement where most official statistics are produced in government departments at the direction of ministers. A parallel set of centralised statistical institutions and organisations has grown up over time, culminating in the 2007 legislative reforms instituting a formally independent central statistical authority. Chapter 6 traces the different credibility imperatives bearing on UK official statistics and shows how these produced demands for centralisation, legislation, and independencewith attention to the political fallout from the Thatcher Government’s defunding of and interference in official statistics, along with subsequent efforts to find arrangements enhancing statistical independence while preserving the decentralised model. The chapter illustrates impacts of UK government statisticians’ behaviours, highlighting problems in the management of the central statistical agency, and conflicts between statisticians over reform. It shows that the distribution of statistical authority in the UK reflects efforts to reconcile post-Thatcher depoliticisation with a decentralised arrangement and Westminster conventions of ministerial prerogative.

This chapter returns to country-level appraisals comparing the distinctive features of the four policy advisory systems (PAS) and implications for the policymaking of different advisory system configurations. The book shows that the Westminster PAS has been significantly transformed over forty years and that its elasticity has been enabled by an administrative tradition that is pragmatic and highly instrumental. Several dimensions are reappraised, providing insights into the state of the PAS. There has been remarkable change in the four PAS in terms of the supply and demand of advice. Some advisers have become more influential; others have been relegated or their influence has fluctuated because of changing ministerial needs, competition from other suppliers and the turbulence of policymaking. The work of policy advising has evolved within the public service and though the increasing professionalisation of external advisory activity. Finally, there are the implications for the quality of public policy through the directions in which PAS have changed. Questions are asked about the effectiveness of advisory systems, the impact on public policy and what learning has occurred from managing PAS. Comparative analysis helps to understand the evolving architecture of PAS and the art and craft of advising governments.

A case-study approach of two Irish cases in the mid-1850s drew popular attention to the vulnerability of women under the existing gendered law of divorce and the need for its reform. The 1856 divorce of John Talbot of Co. Roscommon and Mary Anne (néeMacCausland) of Co. Londonderry was highly publicised. The case also raised popular criticism of Talbot for conspiring to be rid of his wife, the ecclesiastical courts and parliamentary divorce. The case coincided with a lunacy panic regarding the incarceration of sane women in asylums; however, in the Talbot case, Mary Anne never regained her sanity after being detained and subjected to a physical and likely sexual attack to allow her spouse to divorce her on the grounds of adultery. This divorce attracted considerable legal attention and prompted calls for divorce to be removed from the parliamentary arena. The Westmeaths, even after decades of litigation, never secured a divorce. A re-reading of Emily, Marchioness of Westmeath, is presented here to restore her to the historical narrative as a divorce law reformer and challenge Stone’s earlier sexist portrayal of her as petty, vindictive and obsessed with women’s rights.

Although the sexual double standard endured in the divorce court, parliamentary divorce remained lengthier, costlier and more socially and gender-biased. This chapter examines the profile of Irish parliamentary divorce petitioners and legal critics of the system. Successive attempts to reform Irish divorce provision failed. The personal trials that the lack of legislative uniformity in the UK caused was underscored by the Yelverton case which invoked Scottish, Irish and English law and partially inspired a royal commission to consider extending the jurisdiction of the divorce court in 1861. The commission recommended the unification of divorce provision throughout the UK, but this was never implemented. A further royal commission considered the laws of marriage from 1865 and recommended that divorce laws should be unified throughout the UK, but like the earlier calls for Irish divorce reform, this was never enacted: Ireland remained legislatively stranded. The O’Shea divorce in 1891, citing Irish nationalist leader Parnell as co-respondent, also drew the association between morality and divorce ever tighter and the full force of moral Catholicism was unleashed for the first time.

This chapter explores Irish bills for divorce brought to Westminster from 1701 and to the Irish parliament until the Act of Union in 1800. The moral, reputational and financial impact of divorce is considered from a gendered and class-based perspective and noteworthy cases such as that of Sir John Dillon and Lord Abercorn are examined. The profile of the first Irish divorcees in terms of gender, religion, class and grounds for divorce is determined. Moreover, themes of female agency, illegitimacy, collusion, adultery, false testimony (procured in particular from servants) as well as the association between the availability of divorce as an incentive to adultery which became a recurring theme in both clerical and lay debates are also explored in both jurisdictions. The impact of the Act of Union on the rate and profile of Irish divorces is analysed. In addition, the popular criticism and press reportage of Irish divorce allow the tropes of immorality and moral superiority to be defined and considered.

This chapter explores divorce law reform in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland government liaised with Westminster regarding the removal of divorce from parliament’s jurisdiction from 1931; however, Westminster’s passage of Herbert’s bill along with the reform which in 1937 added desertion of three years’ duration; presumption of a spouse’s death; cruelty, although still legislatively undefined; and incurable insanity as sole grounds for divorce revived the debate in regard to equity of divorce provison throughout the UK. Debates concerning the Matrimonial Causes Act (NI) of 1939 are explored alongside the impact of the reform which transferred divorce jurisdiction to the Northern Ireland High Court, reformed the grounds for divorce along English lines and ended the faltering criminal conversation action, replacing it with a statutory action for damages. The subsequent rise in divorce rates in Northern Ireland and later divore law reforms are explored as well as the continuing moral conservatism bolstering cross-party oppoition to ‘easy’ divorce.

Despite the retention of the parliamentary system of divorce for Irish petitioners, divorce law was not static as the changing definition of marital cruelty and precedent established in the divorce court facilitated more Irish parliamentary divorces, especially from female petitioners. The legal definition of marital cruelty evolved from the late 18th century to embrace non-physical violence, the threat of violence and the abuse of children in front of a mother with intent to cause distress. These legal changes were indicative of transformative social mores concerning men’s role in marriage and the marital union more generally. The Irish body of case law pertaining to this shifting definition is explored in addition to the parliamentary divorce of Louisa Westropp, the first Irish woman to divorce whose case established legal precedent in allowing grounds for divorce recognised in the divorce court to be applied to parliament. Contemporaneous reforms in custody rights also impacted and therefore, by the early 20th century, female Irish petitioners were in the majority in bringing divorce bills to Westminster.

The conclusion highlights the shared moral terrain between the majority of faiths on the island of Ireland which pertained throughout much of the history of Irish divorce. Despite the lack of legislative progress pertaining to Irish divorce from the mid-nineteenth century, the grounds for Irish divorce were not inert. Attitudinal changes towards marriage, marital cruelty, husbands’ superiority, wifely endurance and a reassessment of the role of church and state in individual lives collectively led to divorce reform. However, divorce was never easy and its cost was rarely solely financial. With mooted divorce law reform in both the UK and the Republic of Ireland in 2019, the controversy of divorce, so evident throughout its long history, may re-emerge. Yet, only divorce affords the means for a permanent release from the bonds of marriage and a subsequent union, options which were too long denied to many of Ireland’s citizens.

This chapter explores the rationale for and impact of Ireland’s exclusion from the 1857 Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act which moved English (and Welsh) divorce from parliament to court. The lack of engagement with this reform was apparent across the religious divides in Ireland which allows the suggestion of Catholic orthodoxy emerging as victorious against a liberal reform to be challenged. The Irish Catholic and Protestant presses opposed the bill more forcibly than any of the churches which evidences that Irish resistance to divorce was not always denominationally bound. However, akin to the Irish church response to divorce reform, the press never encouraged more popular protest. That Ireland was seen as a case apart in regard to divorce reform is highlighted by the government’s encouragement of other areas of the empire to apply the rulings of the 1857 divorce act. In consequence, by 1869 only Irish divorce bills were routinely heard in Westminster which remained averse to introducing divorce reform for Ireland. This inertia continued for decades as successive administrations proved disinclined to extend the 1857 act to Ireland and few called for its application.