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This chapter explores the interaction between international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), as well as international criminal law. It examines how IHRL influences the application and development of IHL and how human rights principles are integrated into international criminal procedures and substantive law. The chapter discusses the mutual reinforcement and potential conflicts between these branches of international law, highlighting the need for a coherent and integrated approach. It also explores the role of international courts and tribunals in applying and interpreting IHRL, IHL, and international criminal law, and the challenges in ensuring compliance and accountability.
Atrocity crimes and grand corruption: the chapter argues that adopting a “corruption lens” is useful to characterize and understand patterns of crimes against humanity, especially whether acts are widespread or systematic, whether there is a state or organizational policy, how high-ranking actors are tied to crimes by subordinates (“modes of liability”) and whether specific acts constitute crimes under the ICC’s Rome Statute. The chapter uses examples from Mexico and Venezuela to illustrate.
In France and Germany, it would have been unthinkable for a cabinet member of the Vichy government or the Nazi regime to become a national leader after the war. This was not the case in Japan with Kishi Nobusuke, who served as Minister of Trade and Industry in the wartime Tōjō cabinet. Astonishingly, Kishi became Prime Minister in February 1957. Similarly, Emperor Hirohito's war guilt and responsibility were never questioned at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, despite the abundance of crystal-clear evidence. In this article, I discuss how closely the U.S. and Japanese governments have been collaborating for the last 78 years since the end of the Asia-Pacific War in August 1945, supporting one another to whitewash each other's war crimes and responsibility in every possible way.
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, a US citizen who was born in Japan, has taught in both countries. Applying his specialized knowledge of Russian history to an analysis of the US decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, he challenges the prevailing American view that the US decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified. The prevailing view is based on two premises: first, the use of the atomic bombs was the only option available to the US government to avoid launching a costly invasion of the Japanese homeland; and second, the atomic bombings had an immediate and direct impact on Japan's decision to surrender. Dr. Hasegawa rebuts both assumptions. He also assesses a third – and often hidden – justification for dropping the bombs, namely, the American desire for revenge. He argues that, even before the atomic bombings, the United States had already crossed the moral high ground that it had held. He views the US use of atomic bombs as a war crime. But he asserts that this action must be understood in the context of Japan's responsibility for starting the war of aggression and committing atrocities in the Asia–Pacific War.
This article makes use of network analysis to examine the establishment of the War Convicted Benefit Society (Sensō jukei-sha sewa-kai), an influential advocacy group in the popular movement that pushed for amnesty for Japanese war criminals from 1952 to 1958. By graphing the networks created by members of the Society, I demonstrate that early Occupation policies, precisely those that convicted and purged these old elites and resulted in the detention of many of them in Sugamo prison, actually created a new network of conservative power figures by linking the otherwise unconnected old mid-rank military network and the old colonial/political elite network to rally around their common experience of being “prosecuted.”
Numerous complex issues concerning the history of Japanese war crimes cloud the trials that adjudicated justice in postwar East Asia. Discrepancies between fact and fiction, or facts that can be proven in a court of law, result in a situation that even today renders what actually happened during the creation of empire and the ensuing war in Asia open to interpretation. More than seven decades after the war, disagreements about the justice or injustice of these processes continue to feed political friction in the region.
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, a US citizen who was born in Japan, has taught in both countries. Applying his specialized knowledge of Russian history to an analysis of the US decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan, he challenges the prevailing American view that the US decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified. The prevailing view is based on two premises: first, the use of the atomic bombs was the only option available to the US government to avoid launching a costly invasion of the Japanese homeland; and second, the atomic bombings had an immediate and direct impact on Japan's decision to surrender. Dr. Hasegawa rebuts both assumptions. He also assesses a third – and often hidden – justification for dropping the bombs, namely, the American desire for revenge. He argues that, even before the atomic bombings, the United States had already crossed the moral high ground that it had held. He views the US use of atomic bombs as a war crime. But he asserts that this action must be understood in the context of Japan's responsibility for starting the war of aggression and committing atrocities in the Asia–Pacific War.
Julianne House, Universität Hamburg/Hun-Ren Hungarian Research Centre for Linguistics /Hellenic American University,Dániel Z. Kádár, Dalian University of Foreign Languages/Hun-Ren Hungarian Research Centre for Linguistics/University of Maribor
In Chapter 6, we turn to the difficulty of studying sensitive data. In studying politically relevant issues, one may unavoidably encounter phenomena which are sensitive to talk about because they are painful for many. We point out that such data can best be studied if we distance ourselves from the object of our inquiry, by taking a contrastive look at our data. As a case study, we examine political apologies realised after the Second World War by representatives of the Japanese and German states, following war crimes perpetrated by their respective countries. Japanese and German war apologies are highly controversial and have often been described with sweeping overgeneralisations. We believe that it is important to venture beyond such overgeneralisations and examine in a bottom-up and contrastive way – relying on both qualitative and quantitative evidence – exactly how representatives of these countries realised their apologies.
Rebecca West’s novel of ideas, The Birds Fall Down, responds to the intense debate around capital punishment that took place in the UK after the Second World War. Partly motivated by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, which West attended as a journalist, this debate led to the introduction of the Criminal Justice Bill in 1947 and the establishment of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1949. Alongside other public intellectuals, West acted as an honorary member of the National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment, founded in 1955. In such non-fictional works as Black Lamb, Grey Falcon and A Train of Powder, West reflects on the meaning of justice and the appropriateness of punishment for murder, assassination, and crimes against humanity. In The Birds Fall Down, she extends her reflections to the political utility of assassination and the wisdom required to pass judgment on crimes and criminals.
Though their experience was in no way typical of American service in the Vietnam War, American prisoners of war have dominated American perceptions of the conflict. A small, strikingly homogenous group, the POWs were important because of, not despite, their unusual character. As most were pilots captured while waging air war against North Vietnam, they were subjected to harsh treatment by Vietnamese authorities, who sought to make them confess and repent their aggression against the Vietnamese people. But because aviators tended to be older, well-educated, white, career officers who identified deeply with the United States and its mission in Vietnam, American POWs were determined to resist Vietnamese coercion. In enduring torture rather than admit guilt, they inverted the wars moral framework, representing themselves as victims of Vietnamese aggression. Because they so neatly embodied the nation as its white majority wished to imagine it, their suffering and sacrifice worked to redeem the American cause in Vietnam and restore national honor. This chapter explains this phenomenon through close attention to the POW experience in North Vietnams prisons.
Building on the success of previous editions (Cryer et al.), this popular textbook is now expanded and updated in a 5th edition featuring two new co-authors, Elies van Sliedregt and Valerie Oosterveld. A market leader and one of the most globally trusted textbooks on international criminal law, it is known for its accessible and engaging tone and for an even-handed approach that is both critical and constructive. Comprehensively updated and rewritten, this new edition introduces readers to the main concepts of international criminal law, as well as the domestic and international institutions that enforce it, and addresses the latest challenges and controversies surrounding the International Criminal Court. Written by a team of international criminal lawyers who have extensive academic and practical experience in the field, the book engages with critical questions, political and moral challenges, and alternatives to international justice. It contains helpful references to other literature, making it a valuable research resource.
Bearing in mind that the peace process between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) has been an important milestone for transitional justice, this article aims to share some of the good practices and achievements of this process, as well as the setbacks and challenges that could be avoided in future peace processes. The article will highlight relevant contributions from the Chamber for Amnesty or Pardon (CAP) such as impacting the resocialization of former FARC-EP members and developing international humanitarian law discussions in relation to war crimes and less serious crimes. Additionally, it will describe some of the main challenges faced by the CAP, such as the high number of applications for transitional benefits that it receives, the high number of proceedings that it supervises, and the security concerns arising from implementing a peace agreement in a country still in conflict.
Since commencing its illegal invasion in 2022, the Russian military and authorities have committed numerous war crimes against the people of Ukraine. These include the mutilation and execution of combatants; the torture, kidnapping, forced expulsion, rape, and massacre of civilians; and indiscriminate attacks on densely populated areas. In this essay, I evaluate the strategic implications of this misconduct, focusing exclusively on Western responses. I argue that war crimes can and often do negatively impact the strategic goals of the perpetrator, but whether and how this occurs is rarely governed exclusively by the offending action. Western perceptions of battlefield atrocity, shaped as they are by identity, race, and politics, may radically shift from one context to another. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, the status of both the participants and the conflict itself has helped inculcate a particular sensitivity among Western actors to the battlefield criminality of Russia. Drawing on evidence from the 2022 Bucha massacre and the ongoing bombing of Ukrainian civilians, I argue that Russian misconduct has consolidated Western support for the Ukrainian military effort, politically, diplomatically, and materially.
This chapter introduces the law of war crimes including: its historic development, common legal issues such as identifying an armed conflict, and the specific offences constituting war crimes. As for the historic emergence of war crimes law, the chapter looks at the evolution of humanitarian law – on which war crimes law is based. The chapter discusses the key principles of humanitarian law (distinction, proportionality, etc), the challenges of regulating warfare, the emergence of individual criminal responsibility (i.e. war crimes), and the evolution of war crimes in non-international armed conflicts. As for ‘armed conflict’, the chapter discusses common challenges in identifying the character of the armed conflict (international or non-international), for example in situations of invitation, national liberation, proxy forces, and transnational conflict. The chapter reviews the requirements to qualify as an armed conflict – intensity of the conflict and organization of the parties. It then reviews specific illustrations of war crimes, including: crimes against non-combatants (killing, sexual violence, experiments, and so on); attacks on prohibited targets (for example, historic monuments, hospitals, and so on); and attacks likely to inflict disproportionate civilian harm compared to the anticipated military advantage; prohibited weapons; and prohibited methods of warfare.
The ICC launched in 2002 to judge cases against individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It is unique among international institutions in this book in that it imposes its obligations upon individual persons rather than governments. This chapter shows the powers and limits on the authority of the ICC to punish people for large-scale atrocities. The practical power of the ICC is shaped by both the difficulty of apprehending people and the active work of those who wish to remain insulated from accountability.
War crimes related to the decision to carry out attacks during the conduct of hostilities are almost always defined in terms of conduct and not result (Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). Yet it is common for critiques of such decisions to focus on attack results as proof of their alleged illegality. While such results are probative of compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian law rules regulating the conduct of hostilities, they should rarely be indisputable. This article addresses the challenge of attaching probative value to attack results when assessing responsibility for alleged war crimes based on allegedly illicit attack decisions.
The final substantive chapter of the book looks at how all these rules are implemented and enforced, and what mechanisms exist to hold violators of the law accountable for their acts. Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions requires states to ‘ensure respect’ for the rules of IHL, which is achieved through a range of measures such as education of the armed forces and civil society in the rules of IHL and entrenching the rules in domestic legislation. The chapter describes the roles of the ICRC, Protecting Powers and the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission. The development and content of international criminal law are examined, including individual responsibility for war crimes, lesser violations of IHL, crimes against humanity and genocide, and the concept of command responsibility is explained. The growth in international and hybrid criminal tribunals is noted, as well as the roles played by the United Nations and other organisations in encouraging adherence to the rules of IHL. Finally the chapter examines mechanisms for implementation, enforcement and accountability in non-international armed conflict.
Pursuing German and Japanese war criminals and gaining compensation for survivors were high on the agenda of the victorious Allies after 1945. Enthusiasm, however, waned considerably and unforgivably in the context of the Cold War and partial restoration of pre-war elite networks. Long-term continuities in business–government networks in the coordinated economies of Germany and Japan meant that some of those who had been charged with war crimes – and/or those whose wealth derived at least in part from activities associated with the war – figured prominently in major post-war scandals. Over time, however, those directly tainted with pre-1945 crimes and practices begin to retire and die off. Moreover, the export orientation of both countries, combined with other aspects of the globalisation of business, finance, and markets, also changed the composition and dynamics of elite networks. This happened more rapidly and thoroughly in Germany than in Japan, owing to Germany’s greater dependence on exports; its central role in the European Union; and its greater openness to foreign imports and investment. German corporate governance therefore experienced more far-reaching reform than its Japanese counterpart. For many of the same reasons, Germany has made greater strides towards coming to terms with its pre-1945 past than Japan.
The protection of non-combatants in times of autonomous warfare raises the question of the timeliness of the international protective emblem. (Fully) Autonomous weapon systems are often launched from a great distance, and there may be no possibility for the operators to notice protective emblems at the point of impact; therefore, such weapon systems will need to have a way to detect protective emblems and react accordingly. In this regard, the present contribution suggests a cross-frequency protective emblem. Technical deployment is considered, as well as interpretation by methods of machine learning. Approaches are explored as to how software can recognize protective emblems under the influence of various boundary conditions. Since a new protective emblem could also be misused, methods of distribution are considered, including encryption and authentication of the received signal. Finally, ethical aspects are examined.
This chapter discusses the development and application of international humanitarian law (IHL) and its interrelationship with human rights law. It further examines this special relationship, which is of particular importance for the protection of civilians, especially where the applicability of IHL is contested or where IHL constitutes an exception to certain rights, such as the right to life, or fails to prevent and/or provide effective remedies for violations. The chapter seeks to identify the scope of application of IHL and demonstrate the degree to which the two can be reconciled. Moreover, a special case is made for the law applicable in situations of military occupation whereby human rights are subordinate to IHL. Despite this subordination, in practice because international human rights tribunals are not mandated to apply humanitarian law they necessarily interpret and enforce the rights of the victims on the basis of the rights found in their respective statutes. As a result, the jurisprudence of human rights tribunals is not always consistent with IHL. Yet, such tribunals are hard pressed to accept jurisdiction over situations which would otherwise be resolved on the basis of IHL alone. This chapter therefore goes on to discuss the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by human rights tribunals.