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1 results

  • 4 - Preference Aggregation through Voting

  • Randall G. Holcombe, Florida State University
  • Book:
    Following Their Leaders
    Published online:
    16 March 2023
    Print publication:
    23 March 2023, pp 56-71

  • Summary

    This chapter focuses on academic models of collective choice. It discusses voting models and models of social choice to show that the link between instrumental preferences and collective choice outcomes is broken once one recognizes that the political preferences of citizens and voters are expressive, so do not represent the outcomes they most prefer. The models themselves are not wrong, in that they describe the way that expressed preferences are aggregated to make collective decisions. But the interpretation of the models often is mistaken. There is no clear relationship between outcomes of collective decision-making processes and the outcomes that would be preferred by those whose preferences are being aggregated.