This chapter looks at the Chadian political scene from February to September 1979. It chronicles the growing interest of Nigeria in influencing the outcome of Chad’s conflicts. It charts the evolution of Franco-Nigerian relations, from close cooperation in early 1979 to open hostility and Nigerian-Libyan rapprochement towards the middle of the year. This was particularly on display in the context of a series of major peace conferences held in Nigeria among different factions during this time. The chapter also examines the debates among French officials over the evolving role of Tacaud. These principally revolved around the main dilemma posed by Tacaud’s presence after the signature of the Lagos agreement creating a new transitional government in August 1979. On the one hand, suspicion grew on all sides, including within the French government, about the French army’s closeness with Habré. This, combined with strong Libyan and Nigerian pressure, led the Lagos agreement to demand the withdrawal of French forces. On the other hand, all of the Chadian factions privately told their French interlocutors that they wanted Tacaud to remain in the country. Consequently, French policymakers debated Tacaud’s usefulness, and whether or not Giscard should order a complete withdrawal.

In mid-1977 and again in early 1978, the “2nd Army,” now heavily rearmed by Libya, launched a series of devastating attacks against CSM positions in Chad’s northern territories. After a series of failed negotiation efforts on the part of the CSM, rebel moves in the direction of N’Djamena led French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to order a military intervention. Operation Tacaud aimed to protect the capital and the (comparatively) economically prosperous Chadian south from apparent Libyan designs. This chapter examines French diplomatic and military efforts to stabilize Chad in 1977 and 1978, and the policymaking process behind Giscard's decision to intervene on behalf of the CSM. It also looks at the negotiations that led Hissène Habré, who had broken with Goukouni in 1976, to agree to join a coalition government headed by Malloum and supported by France.

This chapter covers the delicate politics surrounding the integration of Habré’s faction into the CSM. It also describes how French military successes against different rebel factions led to divisions within the northern rebellion, and a split between its main leader, Goukouni Weddeye, and Gaddafi’s Libya. It then covers the fighting which broke out between Habré and Malloum in February 1979. The chapter looks at how the balance of power shifted in favor of Habré as Goukouni’s forces infiltrated the capital and joined Habré’s men. The chapter also analyzes the ambiguous role played by France in facilitating a northern victory, as well as the subsequent debates and recriminations within the French policymaking apparatus. This led to a sharp deterioration in relations between French military officials and diplomats. Meanwhile, by early March 1979, over half of N’Djamena’s population had fled the city towards the south, thus effectively leaving behind an ethnically cleansed capital in the hands of a fragile coalition of Frolinat rebels.

This chapter traces the sequence of events leading to the withdrawal of French forces from Chad in April 1980. It begins with the French decision to overthrew Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa, leader of the Central African Empire, partly in response to his increasingly close relations with Gaddafi. However, the French-organized coup also fatally undercut their peacemaking strategy in Chad.Goukouni, now the president of Chad’s transitional government, became worried that France might attempt to overthrow him as well. This led him patch up his relationship with Gaddafi’s regime in preparation for an imminent struggle with Hissène Habré. This chapter examines these events, analyzing the rapid decline in the ability of French policymakers to influence the Chadian political scene. As fighting broke out between Habré’s forces and those allied with Goukouni, a sharp debate erupted among French policymakers about whether to intervene actively on the side of Goukouni or attempt to maintain an increasingly untenable neutrality. Instead, in April 1980, Giscard decided on a complete withdrawal, judging the risks of intervention too high, with little expected gain.