Migrants make up a significant and growing proportion of the aged-care workforce in Australia. Using data from the 2016 National Aged Care Workforce Census and Survey, we investigate employment conditions for Australian-born and overseas-born frontline workers working in residential and home-based aged care, focusing on two key poor job quality indicators. We find that migrant home care workers from non-English-speaking background (NESB) countries are the most likely to be employed on a casual basis and to report hours-related underemployment. Migrant residential care workers from English-speaking background (ESB) countries are more likely to be casual while NESB migrants are more likely to be underemployed. Controlling for a range of employment and socio-demographic characteristics, we find that being an NESB migrant is significantly associated with both casual status and underemployment. Generally, while this association lessens with years spent in Australia, exposure to casual employment is amplified over time for NESB migrants in the residential sector. Holding a temporary visa increased the likelihood of casual employment for residential care workers and underemployment for home care workers. Working for a for-profit employer was also associated with poorer job quality. Further policy shifts in Australia towards temporary migration and increased marketisation of aged care may impact on the working conditions of migrant aged-care workers.

We examine labour market performance in the US and the UK prior to the onset of the Covid-19 crash. We then track the changes that have occurred in the months and days from the beginning of March 2020 using what we call the Economics of Walking About (EWA) that shows a collapse twenty times faster and much deeper than the Great Recession. We examine unemployment insurance claims by state by day in the US as well as weekly national data. We track the distributional impact of the shock and show that already it is hitting the most vulnerable groups who are least able to work from home the hardest – the young, the least educated and minorities. We have no official labour market data for the UK past January but see evidence that job placements have fallen sharply. We report findings from an online poll fielded from 11–16 April 2020 showing that a third of workers in Canada and the US report that they have lost at least half of their income due to the Covid-19 crisis, compared with a quarter in the UK and 45 per cent in China. We estimate that the unemployment rate in the US is around 20 per cent in April. It is hard to know what it is in the UK given the paucity of data, but it has gone up a lot.

In this note, we argue that a considerable part of the explanation for the benign wage growth in the advanced world is the rise in underemployment. In the years after 2008 the unemployment rate understates labour market slack. Underemployment is more important than unemployment in explaining the weakness of wage growth in the UK. The Phillips curve in the UK has now to be rewritten into wage underemployment space. Underemployment now enters wage equations while the unemployment rate does not. There is every reason to believe that the NAIRU has fallen sharply since the Great Recession. In our view the NAIRU in the UK may well be nearer to 3 per cent, and even below it, than around 5 per cent, which other commentators including the MPC and the OBR believe.

In this note, we focus on underemployment as a potential cause of lower wage growth, which itself may have deeper causes, but which has, we would argue, demonstrably changed since the 2008 recession. The gap between our measures of the number of additional hours required by those who want more hours and the number who want less has narrowed recently. Neither have returned to their pre-recession levels. In our view, underemployment remains a major factor in explaining the 2 per cent wage norm that continues to exist in the UK.

This paper addresses the issue of underemployment in the UK labour market – the demand for hours of work is less than workers’ willingness to supply extra hours. Workers would like to work more hours, but there is insufficient product demand to justify additional hours. This phenomenon has been evident in the UK labour market for some time, but has grown significantly during the Great Recession. In this paper, we develop a new index of underemployment which is intended to combine indicators of excess capacity on the extensive (jobs) and intensive (hours) margins of the labour market. This index continued to increase during 2012, though unemployment was stable. The paper also investigates the microeconomic determinants of underemployment, finding that it is particularly prevalent among the young and unqualified.

Drawing on a growing cross-national literature on the social impact of economic crises, this paper investigates the social structuring of economic hardship among urban households in Turkey following the 2001 economic crisis. My goal is to compare the Turkish crisis to other recent crises, particularly in Latin America and Asia, and to assess competing claims about the vulnerability of different social groups. Using data from the study entitled Turkish Family Life under Siege—a nationally representative sample of urban households of work-aged married couples—the results paint a picture of widespread social devastation as measured by key labor market outcomes: job loss, unemployment duration, earnings instability, and under-employment. The findings suggest that existing patterns of social inequality related to class and status—education, age, ethnicity, and occupation—were reinforced and exacerbated by the 2001 macro-economic crisis. In contrast to claims that the impact was skewed towards higher socio-economic groups, the brunt of the 2001 crisis was felt by disadvantaged social groups with few assets to buffer economic hardship. Economic hardship was higher among labor force participants who are younger, less educated, male, Kurdish-speakers, private-sector employees, and residents of non-central regions. I discuss the implications with respect to the previous research on economic crises, the role of Turkish contextual factors, and the need for social policy reform, particularly in the context of the current global economic crisis.

One of the main puzzles associated with the Great Recession has been the muted increase in recorded unemployment in the UK. In this paper we explore possible explanations for the behaviour of the UK labour market during the period of the recession. We establish that there has been significant underemployment, which partly explains the sluggish increase in unemployment, but also means that (i) significant numbers of workers are supplying fewer hours of work than they would like and (ii) when recovery comes, profit maximising employers are likely to increase the hours of existing workers, rather than making new hires. This particularly disadvantages the young. Our new analysis points to significant levels of underemployment among younger age groups — whether this is measured in relation to their actual hours of work, their desired hours of work, or their labour force participation.