The British strategy from late 1972 aimed to solve the conflict politically by drawing moderate nationalists and unionists into the centre ground, while degrading the Provisional IRA militarily. In May 1974 the strategy unravelled when the Ulster Workers’ Council strike destroyed the power-sharing compromise. This chapter explains how the Northern Ireland conflict became intractable before the strike. The British Army lacked the capacity to overcome the Provisional IRA militarily, and the decision to appease loyalism backfired. The UVF and UDA were emboldened to the point where their violence strengthened republicanism. This chapter shows how tactical adaptation allowed the Provisional IRA to survive. The army lacked enough troops to impose a force concentration powerful enough to crush republican resistance. The army’s operational approach centred around targetting the Provisional leadership, which did limit the Provisionals’ full offensive potential. However, the Provisional IRA replaced lost leaders and reconstituted itself again and again. The chapter also describes the army’s response to the constant flow of criticism about soldiers. Community relations projects convinced soldiers their presence was valued; they under-estimated the hostility directed at them as coming from a vocal minority. An obsession with propaganda made it difficult to discern when complaints were genuine or bogus.

This chapter analyses British strategy once direct rule had been imposed from London, and covers the period up to September 1972, when talks between the political parties happened without the moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party. The chapter documents the efforts by the army to buttress Northern Ireland Secretary William Whitelaw’s quest for peace. Discontent lingered amongst elements in the security forces over restraint in fighting the IRA. Low-level brutality continued, particularly in tough regiments. In July the British government and the Provisionals held secret negotiations. Beforehand, republicans and loyalists targeted civilians to shape the impending dialogue. Senior figures in the Ministry of Defence believed loyalist attacks on Catholics might encourage republicans to modify their demands. Loyalist mobilisation probably convinced the government not to give anything away to republicans. These events, and the success of Operation Motorman in re-entering republican areas, persuaded the army to go back on the offensive against the Provisionals. In doing so they committed to retaining internment, expanding interrogation and adopting a modus vivendi with loyalists. These choices allowed the force level in Northern Ireland to be brought down, as demanded by the commitment to NATO, and swelling discord about repeated deployments on a deeply unpleasant mission.