The Introduction sets the scene by describing the relevance of the idea of a symbiotic relationship between competition and democracy in the history of competition law and the contemporary policy debate. It identifies the gap in the literature, explains the research question and the purpose of the book, and presents the argument of the book in a nutshell. It starts with the observation that the idea of a link between competition and democracy is a recurrent theme in US and EU competition law. However, existing scholarship has so far struggled to clearly explain what the relationship between competition and democracy actually consists of. This knowledge gap is filled by this book which provides a clear, conceptually sound, and surprising answer to this research question. It argues that the idea of competition–democracy nexus is grounded in a republican understanding of liberty as non-domination which can be traced back to the political thought of the Ancient Roman republic and fundamentally differs from our contemporary negative concept of liberty as non-interference. The purpose of the book is to demonstrate how this republican concept of liberty explains the idea of a competition–democracy nexus in US and EU competition law.

This chapter analyses how the ideal of republican liberty and the concept of a competition–democracy nexus have been implemented through concrete competition policy. To this end, the chapter looks at the interpretation and application of the three substantive pillars (i.e., the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, the regulation of monopoly power, and the control of mergers) of competition law in the US until the 1970s and in the EU until the early 2000s. It describes how all three branches of competition law were interpreted in accordance with a republican conception of economic liberty as non-domination that perceived the very existence of concentrated economic power as an obstacle to economic freedom and democracy. This republican concern about liberty as non-domination as the central element of the competition–democracy nexus primarily manifested itself in the overarching policy goal of preserving a polycentric market structure as an institution of antipower. The republican antitrust tradition in the United States and in Europe built upon the structuralist approaches envisaged by various republican antitrust paradigms to operationalise the idea of a competition–democracy nexus that we discussed in the previous chapter.

The question under which circumstances an undertaking is liable for its own competition law infringement – not to mention the liability for infringements committed by an affiliated undertaking – is of invaluable practical importance. From the early days of European competition law, there has been an interesting legal relationship between the single economic entity as the addressee of EU competition law and the respective entities under national corporate laws. Legend has it, businesses in some European jurisdictions can avoid fines by way of corporate restructuring, whilst in other jurisdictions this is not an option. The present contribution traces the developments in the EU and in Germany during recent years with special regard to the so-called German sausage gap – a once well-known and much-exploited lacuna that helped shelter companies from liability through specific corporate restructuring.