Responding to the death of Victoria Climbié in 2003, the Laming Report stated that cultural differences should never again be a factor in inadequate child protection. Yet since that time there have been further deaths of children involving exorcism and allegations of witchcraft, based in part on particular understandings of Christianity. Situations resulting in forced marriage, cliterodectomy, ‘honour’ killing and corporal punishment are practices often perceived as arising from religious belief, both by those who defend them and by critics. This article explores practices perceived as grounded in religious belief or culture that conflict with current child protection practice and norms about what is harmful to children. The role of religious education, rights to manifest religious belief and different understandings of adoption are also considered as examples of religious difference in understandings about children. Engagement with religious difference through a defence of children's rights and autonomy are proposed as one means to resolve conflicts between religious worldviews and what it means to protect children. The aim is to identify and foster reflection and debate about different understandings of what constitutes harm, in order to enhance consensus over child protection where views of what is harmful differ radically.1

Embassy bank accounts are among the properties of states most widely present in foreign states. Accordingly, they constitute an ideal target for attachment by creditors. International instruments have largely upheld state immunity from execution regarding bank accounts, however. Likewise, state practice largely – and apparently increasingly – supports state immunity from measures of attachment, by applying a presumption that funds in embassy bank accounts are used for governmental non-commercial purposes. This approach is overly deferential to the state. Instead, it is argued that domestic courts should require that the state, at least partially, discharge the burden of proof regarding the nature (commercial/sovereign) of the funds in the bank account. A failure to discharge this burden should result in a rejection of immunity. Only such an approach adequately balances the interests of states and creditors, and does sufficient justice to the creditor's right of access to a court. In addition, it is argued that such a balance is also brought about by construing literally general waivers of immunity from attachment, as not requiring an additional specific waiver regarding embassy bank accounts.

Petitioner, the Libyan National Oil Corp. (NOC), filed the petition to confirm an arbitral award rendered in Paris against Libyan Sun Oil Co. (LSOC), a Delaware corporation. The petition was based on the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention). LSOC opposed the petition on the grounds that NOC was not entitled to access to U.S. courts because of the state of relations between the United States and Libya and that the Libyan Sanctions Regulations prevented NOC from maintaining its claim in the absence of a license from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. In addition, LSOC argued that confirmation of the award should be denied under various provisions of the Convention, including the “public policy” defense embodied in Article V(2)(b). The district court (per Latchum, J.) held that NOC had standing to bring the petitión and that the defenses set forth in the Convention were inapplicable. The award was thus confirmed.