There are two practices of constitutional review: the diffuse review by the judiciary with supreme courts as the final appellate body in common law countries and the concentrated review by constitutional courts outside the ordinary judiciary in civil law countries. Though we observe a tendency towards a convergence of diffuse and concentrated review, there are still differences. In this chapter, the comparative merits and problems of concentrated versus diffuse review are evaluated. In order to compare the types of apex courts, a normative concept of constitutional review is developed. According to this concept, the most important precondition for legitimate and effective constitutional review is the difference between judicial and political decision-making. Judges who are capable of respecting this difference, enhance social integration by establishing a specific mechanism to correct procedural and substantive injustices. When evaluated by this standard, neither supreme nor constitutional courts are superior. Rather, the problem of both practices concerns a gradual process of a judicialization of politics. More and more political questions are decided by apex courts with constitutional review power, thereby reducing political alternatives. In concluding, a division of labor between judges and legislators is suggested that promises legitimate and effective constitutional review enriching democratic governance.

The chapter presents a comparative analysis of the application of proportionality in the six jurisdictions analysed in the book: Germany, Canada, South Africa, Israel, Poland, and India. The analysis focuses on the relationship and division of labour between proportionality's subtests and the function of the multi-stage doctrine as a whole. Examining two central attributes of the proportionality doctrine in the theoretical literature – the sequential structure of the analysis and the conception of a single dominant element – the chapter demonstrates how several of the analysed courts deviate from a strictly sequential model and present a tendency towards an integrated approach to proportionality. Descriptively, some potential causes for the gravitation of courts towards an integrative model of proportionality are offered. Normatively, the argument is made that an integrative use of proportionality analysis is also desirable: recognizing the connections between the stages and allowing feedback between them fully exploits the analytical potential inherent in proportionality analysis. This type of proportionality analysis best reflects the role of the court in ensuring that rights are limited only when justified, and provides the most positive guidance to policy-makers.