Chapter 11 examines Israel’s foreign policy amid the demise of the Barak government and the rise to power of Ariel Sharon. As the Barak government entered its final phase, Israel’s foreign policy was marked by a serious contradiction. The minority government, headed by Barak, sought to salvage the peace process - by accepting the Clinton parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian final peace. However, the security network defied government by deploying overwhelming military force in response to the eruption of the al-Aqsa Intifada. Amid this Janus-faced foreign policy, the chapter explains the rise of Ariel Sharon to power, which was marked by a quandary. Sharon came to power as Israel’s engagement foreign policy stance was discredited. However, the idea of restoring Israel’s foreign policy of entrenchment and its corollary of clinging to a Greater Israel was also unfeasible as Israel remained signed up to the Oslo agreements. Thus, the foreign policymaking circle surrounding Ariel Sharon, who had a reputation for uncompromising resolve, determination, and tenacity, was left searching for a foreign policy paradigm.

Chapter 12 evaluates Israeli foreign policy amid the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing US-led global war on terror. The chapter contributes to the literature by demonstrating how, amid the global war on terror, Israel pursued a foreign policy that amounted to a frontal attack on engagement, which reflected the collapse of the domestic support in Israel for this foreign policy stance. Accordingly, the Sharon government offered virtually no response to the Arab peace initiative, which was launched by the Arab League in March 2002.The chapter ends by unearthing how the global war on terror engendered a shift in the role, played hitherto by the USA, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. US foreign policy would no longer hinge on mediation. Instead, it would be based on the principles guiding its global war on terror, namely, transformative diplomacy, regime change, and democratization.

Chapter 14 is devoted to the resurgence of unilateralism during Ariel Sharon’s second government. It provides new information on the decision-making process leading to Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza Strip in August 2005.The account exposes how Sharon and his circle of confidants secured the support of the USA and Egypt before informing the Israeli government, the security network, and the Israeli public of the plan to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip.This prompted significant opposition within the security network and a fierce political response from within Sharon’s own party, Likud. The chapter examines how Sharon and his confidants overcame these domestic obstacles while liaising informally with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority on a successful unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. By way of a summary, the chapter outlines the consequences of disengagement, which included strengthening Israel’s grip on the West Bank, dividing the Palestinians and redrawing Israel’s southwest border.