This chapter explores political rights under international human rights law. It covers the right to self-determination, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of association and assembly, electoral rights, and the right to participate in public affairs. The chapter examines the legal frameworks and standards for protecting these rights, the obligations of states to ensure their effective exercise, and the role of international bodies in monitoring and enforcing compliance. It also highlights the challenges in promoting political rights in different political and cultural contexts and the importance of fostering inclusive and participatory governance.

Tribes operated governments since time out of mind. Tribes developed institutions to manage their lands, people, and resources. While European arrival brought many hardships, tribes adapted, but eventually, tribes were forced onto reservations. Tribes endured attempts to exterminate their existence as distinct governments and cultures. Despite fifty years of the federal government’s tribal self-determination policy, tribes remain subject to excessive federal constraints on their sovereignty. Hence, tribes continue to struggle with crime and poverty. Tribes need greater autonomy to address the problems in their communities, and this requires treating tribes as nations again.

When tribes are allowed to operate as governments, states will push back because states fear tribal competition. In particular, states are concerned tribes will offer lower tax rates and other legal incentives to attract businesses to their land. This is a misguided concern. States already craft numerous exceptions to their laws, often designed specifically for their favorite corporations; plus, the source of state power over tribes is lacking. Apart from this, tribal development benefits states. New jobs in Indian country often employ non-Indians who purchase goods and pay taxes off reservation. Thus, tribal sovereignty also serves as a shield against state protectionism and promotes economic opportunities that benefit everyone.

Tribes struggle with many socioeconomic problems, including poverty and crime. Though the United States claims to support tribal self-determination, tribes remain subject to unique, federally imposed constraints on their sovereignty. This book argues removing the federal limitations on tribal sovereignty is the key to improving life in Indian country.

This chapter identifies and examines the elements determining the legal content of any given theory of, or positive law provision for, the human right to resist. It reviews the primary triggers or conditions for activation, indicating the ‘right to resist what’, including ‘tyranny’, ‘oppression’, and ‘other violations’. It reviews the secondary triggers or conditions for activation, indicating the ‘right to resist when’, in particular the necessity condition. It also reviews both aspects of the personal scope, being the rights-holders, indicating ‘who may resist’, and also the duty-bearers, indicating ‘whose corresponding duty’. It identifies a four-fold typology of legitimate ‘object and purpose’, or ‘right to resist why’, being for human rights enforcement, for self-defence, for self-determination, and for ‘peace’ or human security. The final element examined is the material scope of application, or ‘right to resist how’, identifying three competing approaches to permissible means, and affirming proportionality limitations and other applicable limitations in international human rights law and international criminal law, as well as grounds for discretionary non-exercise. This general analytical template for identification and comparison of elements and therefore content is then applied to the evidence of legal sources of the right considered in Chapters 5–7.

This chapter analyzes the norm impasses over the status of Kosovo after its declaration of independence in February 2008 and over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following the 2008 August war. Both cases happened within quick succession, revolved around the same well-established norms in the United Nations (UN) Charter – the rights to territorial integrity vs. self-determination – and showed an interesting reversal of sides: While the United States (US) and European states recognized Kosovo’s statehood and rejected Russia’s emphasis on Serbian territorial integrity, the US and European states rejected Russia’s support of South Ossetia’s statehood and emphasized Georgian territorial integrity. These norm impasses became protracted because each side received social support from key audiences, or at least only muted criticism, for their interpretations, lowering the cost of disagreement. These disputes show both the power and limits of international law: The US’s sui generis frame and Russia’s quasi-legal argumentation indicate that there is a strong collective expectation regarding using international law to justify claims. Yet these cases also indicate that protracted norm impasses weaken individual norms: Unclear norm meaning gives leeway for interpretation, which can be used to craft interpretations that appeal to important audiences and thereby reduce pressure to abandon contested norm interpretations.

Digital sovereignty is a fluid and complex concept. This chapter highlights the necessity to consider digital sovereignty strategies, policies, and governance mechanisms from a holistic and long-term perspective. Digital sovereignty plays a pivotal role in fostering self-determination, while remaining critical to cybersecurity and the control capabilities of the “digital sovereign.” The “sovereign” can be an individual, a community, a corporation, a state, or a group of states. Taking an agnostic approach to digital sovereignty, the authors explore diverse practices and provide insight into what this concept means in practical terms. Digital technologies can facilitate enormous advancements to be put at the service of people, but can also be weaponized against individuals, corporations, and nation-states. BRICS countries’ approaches offer telling examples of not only how and why the need for digital sovereignty can emerge but also how dysfunctional the implementation of digital sovereignty policies may become without a coherent and long-term vision. Ultimately BRICS experiences illustrate that enhancing a digital sovereign’s self-determination, cybersecurity, and control is likely to reduce the undue influence of other digital actors. However, the success of a digital sovereignty strategy largely depends on the understanding, consistency, resourcefulness, and, ultimately, organizational capabilities of aspiring digital sovereigns.

This chapter traces how the concept of ethnicity emerged as a depoliticised alternative to nationality. By the end of the nineteenth century, the triumph of nationalism as the hegemonic source of state legitimacy had resulted in the politicisation of the nation concept. This conceptual linkage of ‘nation’ with ‘state’ opened up a terminological vacuum: If nationhood implied statehood, what label should be given to those stateless nations and national minorities that had neither a state of their own nor the political capacity to acquire one? Against this backdrop, the chapter traces how an embryonic concept of ethnicity was articulated to fill in the terminological void. The chapter’s empirical focus is on the early twentieth-century academic literature on nationalism and the establishment of the world’s first international minority rights regime after the First World War. The argument also has significant implications for debates surrounding the conceptual distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism.

For many postcolonies, a national currency—like a constitution, flag, or passport—was a necessary accompaniment to independence. Money and credit were more than potent symbols of decolonization; they were means of constituting a new political order. This Introduction argues that the monetary regimes established in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania aimed to remake their independent societies, turning savings, loans, and other financial instruments into the infrastructure of citizenship and statecraft. These instruments tried to create a “government of value” in which personal interest and collective advance were aligned through mechanisms that were simultaneously ethical and economic, cultural and political. They did so because colonial subjects experienced empire as not only political domination but also a constraint on economic liberties. Yet, the ensuing decolonization was at best partial, not least because the value of national currencies depended on the accumulation of foreign money. Moreover, the independent political economy of East Africa created new inequalities and divisions. Struggles over money, credit, and commodities would animate a series of struggles between bankers and bureaucrats, farmers and smugglers in the coming decades. By detailing the notion of the “moneychanger state,” this chapter provides the conceptual frameworks to understand these conflicts in new ways.

This chapter offers a synthetic overview of the range of international law issues that arose during the course of the Vietnam War, especially as Americans took over from the French after Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and moved towards massive escalation between 1964 and 1973. The chapter begins with the debate about what law applied to the conflict, which turned on the legal status of South Vietnam. The chapter then asks what claims were possible and plausible when it came to the legality of American intervention in the war. Next, the chapter addresses the different kinds of warfare in which the United States engaged, from its bombing campaigns over North Vietnamese territory and waters to the changing forms of its counterinsurgency in the South and, later, across the Cambodian border. Finally, the chapter concludes by examining the legal legacy of Vietnam: not only how it led to the most significant substantive development of the laws of war since the Geneva Conventions, the First and Second Additional Protocols, but also, and equally importantly, how it ensured that international law would play (for good or ill) a central role in debate over and analysis of all future conflicts.

This chapter investigates (1) whether there is a convincing justification for the All-Affected Principle, (2) whether it is best understood as substantive or procedural principle, and (3) whether it provides a useful way to approach boundary questions. Though the All-Affected Principle is often justified as realizing self-determination in political decision-making, I argue that the AAP does not do so. Instead, the ideal of self-determination, properly understood, supports individual and collective autonomy rights, and institutional arrangements that are at odds with a global democracy of the all-affected.