As ice recedes, the governance of the Arctic is undergoing a significant change. What was once considered a frozen desert with little relevance to the legal system, the Arctic has gradually become a global object of governance. Furthermore, the growing political salience of the Arctic Ocean has generated interest in its governance beyond Arctic states, particularly Asian states such as China, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. These countries have been actively participating in regional cooperation arrangements, including the Arctic Council. Undoubtedly, science diplomacy has been an important driver in shaping the governance of the Arctic and maintaining it as a low-tension area. However, this perception is now being put to the test following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Amidst this crisis, we explore whether science diplomacy can continue to promote peaceful collaboration in the Arctic region. Our research suggests that science diplomacy could potentially aid in the future of Arctic governance, particularly with regard to the involvement of Asian states. We analyse the legal and geopolitical factors involved in determining the potential roles of Asian states in Arctic governance, including whether they could serve as a bridge between the West and Russia or if their actions might further fragment Arctic governance.

The Arctic region is commonly seen as a territory of international dialogue and cooperation. This perception is largely due to the science diplomacy efforts that are largely being contributed by universities, scientific centres, research teams and individual scholars. This paper discusses the Arctic science diplomacy initiatives proposed by Russia’s northernmost federal university. Of particular interest is the case of establishing in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation of national biological monitoring network – the initiative supported by the government-funded mega-grant programme. Our analysis suggests that two pillars of science diplomacy – “science for diplomacy” and “diplomacy for science” – can be successfully combined within the framework of one project. Evidence is provided of the pursuit of national interests being not a limiting factor but rather a driver in the process of promoting diplomatic collaborations in science, serving as a third science diplomacy pillar. Significant progress towards ensuring peace and harmony in the Arctic and sustaining international dialogue on science-based responses to global challenges has been achieved through science diplomacy initiatives proposed by Northern (Arctic) Federal University (NArFU). The authors confirm that most effective tools for establishing good neighbourly relations in the Arctic and promoting international cooperation are offered by scientific discussion.

Recent years have shown that international science dialogue exists at the edge of turbulence and is disturbed by different geopolitical events. The notion of science diplomacy has taken the critical discourse to different levels of actors. Such a discourse exposes the epistemological ambivalence and methodological imbalance of both science and diplomacy in this phenomenon. Current geopolitical conditions have revealed new edges of science diplomacy instruments that spread from “soft” to “hard” practices. Different levels of dialogue and cooperation have shown different examples of resilience and adaptability (or the opposite) to the external turbulence. The phenomenon of regionalisation in science diplomacy is facing criticism from the science community while the current geopolitical situation has dramatically influenced the Arctic science dialogue, as well as governance practices. This commentary discusses particular examples of existing Arctic science diplomacy practices in current geopolitical conditions which are reflected in the Arctic theoretical and practical discourse.

The DIMA Network (Developing Innovative Multi-proxy Analyses – in Siberia and the Russian Far East (SRFE)) started from a small nucleus of palaeoenvironmental researchers in the UK and SRFE at a workshop in 2008 and currently includes researchers from over 25 institutions. The mutual interest in creating long-term records of environmental change was rekindled during workshops in Magadan (2018), Tomsk (2018) and Southampton (2019). These events were organised to connect researchers from the UK and SRFE with these aims: (1) provide training in new techniques and methods, (2) facilitate knowledge transfer about local sites and conditions, (3) stimulate large-scale collaborative projects across SRFE and (4) inspire a new generation of palaeoenvironmental researchers.

Each year, hundreds of international researchers enter Greenland to conduct scientific fieldwork. Historically, they have had little interaction with local communities and scientists at Greenland research institutes. Recognising that collaboration between Greenland and the United States can yield better research, consider more diverse perspectives, articulate the benefits of research to Greenland society, and train the next generation in a collaborative framework, representatives from both countries have been engaged in a series of events to cultivate bilateral relationships. Here, we describe the process of these events (workshops, conference sessions, and public dialogues), the findings, and the outcomes that have followed. Prior to this focused engagement, United States and Greenland scientists typically pursued their research independently. Since the engagement, more researchers from both countries have successfully partnered to obtain funding for collaborative research. Furthermore, development of a bilateral collaboration network is underway. The focused approach on bilateral engagement also proved essential for maintaining research and other activities during the global pandemic. When United States researchers were prevented from entering Greenland, their Greenland partners were able to continue the fieldwork, ensuring that progress was not lost. Future international projects can build on these successes to expand collaborative and interdisciplinary research in Greenland.

Dominant geopolitical narratives on the Arctic argue that the region is either edging towards conflict or international law is respected and peace is maintained through cooperation to address shared concerns. While both of these narratives are present in the Arctic states’ strategies, most of them tend to support collaborative efforts. Science diplomacy (SD) is a useful mechanism in this regard as it helps states overcome potential disagreements and can stimulate cooperation in other areas. Given the growing concerns about global risks, SD is more important now than ever before. In our study, we identify and focus on three indicators for potential SD in the Arctic strategies: i) scientific infrastructure; ii) membership in intergovernmental/interparliamentary and scientific/education organisations and networks and iii) specific areas of scientific cooperation. Considering the intensive scientific activity in the region, it is not surprising that the strategies discuss different forms of research and scientific cooperation, although none explicitly use the term “science diplomacy”. Nevertheless, our analysis reveals the Arctic states do apply the SD concept in their strategies and use three types of diplomacy – science in diplomacy, science for diplomacy or diplomacy for science – in the three indicators.

It has been argued that science diplomacy (SD) helps avoid or mitigate conflicts among stakeholders in the Arctic. Yet underlying some of these well-intended and sometimes successful initiatives is a one-sided understanding of SD. The most recent literature takes a more differentiated approach towards the means and ends of SD. It shows that international scientific interaction is shaped by the twofold logic of competition and collaboration. Instruments of SD can be meant to serve national interests, collective regional goals or global agendas. The present paper disentangles these confounding discourses of collaboration and competition based on a conceptually enhanced SD framework. It analyses Arctic strategies and two cases of Arctic SD, the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation and research activities on Svalbard, to reveal the mechanisms of collaboration and competition in the sphere of international science in relation to security, environment and economy. By pointing out where and how science is currently being used in the Arctic, this article provides (a) a systematic overview of the state of SD in the region and (b) a tool for policy-makers and scientists to assess what impact different facets of SD have in Arctic politics.

Science diplomacy has been instrumental in facilitating cooperation in the Arctic region, yet through the projection of vast hydrocarbon potential in the region, it has also served to undermine the major transformation necessary in Arctic decision-making towards the goals of climate governance. This article surveys the translation of science from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) reports (i.e. the CARA study and Factsheet 2008-3049) on Arctic oil and gas and its transformation into common knowledge within Arctic discourse through repetition by the agents in between and its subsequent adoption into Arctic policy documents. In this process, we interrogate the production of the science underpinning US science diplomacy and the influence of this science on international Arctic discourse and policy use science diplomacy. This paper contributes to the literature of science diplomacy in the Arctic by examining the contributions of the USGS to Arctic policy discourses and its impact on Arctic governance at the nexus of science diplomacy on climate and energy.

At the Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik on 20 May 2021, Russia assumed the chairmanship of the council for the second time since its establishment in 1996. Though some Russian analysts and practitioners were skeptical about the usefulness of such a mechanism during the 1980s and 1990s, Russia has become an active contributor to the progress of the Arctic Council (AC). Russia’s first term as chair during 2004–2006 led to the creation of the Arctic Contaminants Action Program as an Arctic Council Working Group. Since then, Russia has served as co-lead of the Task Forces developing the terms of the 2011 agreement on search and rescue, the 2013 agreement on marine oil spill preparedness and response, and the 2017 agreement on enhancing international scientific cooperation. Russia also has participated actively in the creation of related bodies including the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Economic Council whose chairmanships rotate together with the chairmanship of the AC. Now, far-reaching changes in the broader setting are posing growing challenges to the effectiveness of these institutional arrangements. The impacts of climate change in the high latitudes have increased dramatically; the pace of the extraction and shipment of Arctic natural resources has accelerated sharply; great-power politics have returned to the Arctic foregrounding concerns regarding military security. Together, these developments make it clear that a policy of business as usual will not suffice to ensure that the AC remains an important high-level forum for addressing Arctic issues in a global context. The programme Russia has developed for its 2021–2023 chairmanship of the council is ambitious; it proposes a sizeable suite of constructive activities. In this article, however, we go a step further to explore opportunities to adapt the Arctic governance system to the conditions prevailing in the 2020s. We focus on options relating to (i) the AC’s constitutive arrangements, (ii) links between the council and related governance mechanisms, (iii) the role of science diplomacy, and (iv) the treatment of issues involving military security. We conclude with a discussion of the prospect of organising a heads of state/government meeting during the Russian chairmanship as a means of setting the Arctic governance system on a constructive path for the 2020s.

This article provides an historical account and analysis of the repurposing of Ny-Ålesund from Arctic coalmining settlement to Norwegian-administered international research base in Svalbard. Three levels of analysis are employed to explain the settlement’s transformation and its rising geopolitical significance, focusing primarily on the period of rapid internationalisation and expansion of scientific activities starting in the late 1980s. The local level examines Norway’s efforts to maintain effective occupation of greater Kongsfjorden by promoting research, underpinned by the economisation of the area’s near-pristine natural environment as a non-extractive resource for science; the global level applies the concept of telecoupling to consider the role of events and processes at larger spatial scales that facilitated Ny-Ålesund’s transformation; and the “glocal” level explains how the interaction of Norwegian and global actors in the locality of Ny-Ålesund have collectively shaped the community’s institutions over some 30 years. The article also reflects on recent policy changes signalling more assertive Norwegian administration and greater coordination of research in Ny-Ålesund.

International scientific institutions are preferred settings to explore prominent topics in the transnational approaches to the recent history of science. These include: the dichotomy between universalism and contextualism in the historical evolution of exact sciences; the historical transformation of the ideals of scientific internationalism; the tensions between these historically changing ideals and scientists’ national allegiances; the balance between scientific and diplomatic activities of such institutions; and the issue of how the complex ideological, socio-political roles these institutions play affected the actual evolution of science.

Inspired by these overreaching themes, the paper presents a conceptual framework for pursuing a comparative analysis of IAU and IUPAP. A bird’s-eye view of the parallel historical developments of these two unions shows that, in spite of their common origins in the highly politicized context of the post-WWI reconstruction of international cooperation, IAU and IUPAP followed diverging trajectories in many respects. It is argued that a deeper study of these differences might give important insights to properly understand the relevance of specific disciplines’ scientific needs in the way the ideals and practices of scientific internationalism were actualized through the 20th century.