On 29 December 1838, the Dean of Exeter Cathedral, Whittington Landon, died. In the months that followed, the cathedral chapter repeatedly refused to elect the individuals nominated by the Crown, setting the stage for a protracted struggle that would play out in Parliament and in the Court of Queen's Bench. This is the story of R v The President and Chapter of the Cathedral Church of St Peter in Exeter.1

On 6 December 2023, seven-year-old William Brown was struck and killed by a hit-and-run driver when he was retrieving his football from the road outside his home. A Year 3 pupil at St Eanswythe's Church of England Primary School in Folkestone, he had walked through the grounds of St Mary and St Eanswythe's Church every day on his way to school and had attended services there. His parents wanted to bury him in the churchyard, but although the Vicar was willing to conduct the burial, the churchyard had been closed by Order in Council in 1857 under the provisions of the Burial Act 1855, with only one exception being made for a burial in 1898. Because the churchyard had been closed, under section 1 of that Act his burial would require an Order of the Privy Council.

This article explores traditional conceptions of non-justiciability in British Courts in honour of Francis Mann. It highlights the move by domestic courts away from traditional ‘no-go’ areas towards a more nuanced and balanced understanding of the respective roles and competences of the executive and the judiciary; and sees this as a not unfavourable development in an era when domestic recourse is often the only practicable means by which an individual, as opposed to a State, may obtain redress for alleged misconduct on the international plane.

This paper assesses the current state of the war prerogative, specifically focusing on deployment decisions. It outlines the constitutional position over troop deployments, scrutinises recent reform efforts and problematises the rationale underpinning those reforms. The paper proceeds along one simple normative claim: that against the backdrop of frequent interventions, the publication of the Iraq Inquiry and a series of Bills that have sought to statutorise deployment decisions, less use-of-force is better than more use-of-force, and constitutional arrangements ought to reflect this. The paper begins with an exegesis of the most recent attempt to bring deployment decisions onto a statutory footing, focusing on: (a) the difficulties and concomitant problems in defining ‘conflict decisions’; and (b) whether it could make deployment decisions reviewable. The paper then seeks to examine the rationale for reform, arguing that the main impetus behind the series of efforts has been to democratise the process of troop deployments when instead they should focus on use-of-force reduction.

In R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the Supreme Court of the UK (1) held that the UK Government had no prerogative power to initiate the formal process whereby the UK will withdraw from the EU and (2) declined to recognise any requirement that the devolved legislatures’ consent be obtained in respect of legislation authorising the Government to commence the withdrawal process. This article critically examines Miller, arguing that the majority's analysis veers between unwarranted muscularity in relation to the prerogative issue and unnecessary conservatism as regards the devolution issue. The article goes on to argue that while the majority judgment's restrictive approach to the prerogative may be viewed as a progressive victory for constitutional principle, such an evaluation can be sustained only if a set of relatively traditional constitutional premises are adopted to begin with. The article also contends that the general approach adopted by the majority is problematic, given its willingness to invoke arguments of constitutional principle without adequately engaging with questions about what the pertinent principles are, and argues that such an intellectually lackadaisical mode of constitutional adjudication is to be deprecated.

Three great constitutional conflicts — Great Britain: Commons v. Lords — Parliament Act 1911 — United States: President v. Supreme Court over New Deal — Court Packing plan Belgium: King v. conscience — Democracy wins in each of these cases.