The chapter sets off by examining the theoretical bases upon which a non-state actor (NSA) may be deemed to possess human rights obligations and critiques the various approaches put forward by states and the scholarly community. It then goes on to examine a variety of NSAs along with their own distinct position as regards their human rights role. Some NSAs, such as international financial institutions (IFIs), take a legalistic approach to the matter and are generally wary of accepting even the more fundamental obligations, whereas other actors are keen to achieve a broader human rights agenda and are thus willing to accept some human rights commitments. Besides intergovernmental organisations we also focus on multinational corporations (MNCs) and the way in which their operations have a significant impact on the rights of populations worldwide. It shall be demonstrated that, while their human rights ‘obligations’, if any, have largely arisen as a result of voluntary undertakings, they are now entering a hybrid phase of limited regulation, or at least of an attempt at regulation. Finally, we shed some light on national liberation movements and rebel groups and their distinct responsibilities under international humanitarian law (IHL).

Aiming to move beyond the limited primary sources on which polarised debate is usually based, this chapter reviews new data on UN Security Council practice in response to consensual interventions. From 1990 to 2013, the Council passed resolutions on 76 per cent of all internal conflicts. This chapter evaluates that response in light of four leading theories: of the Court in Nicaragua, that governmental invitations are always valid; of the Institut de droit international (IDI), that pro-government interventions are ‘allowable’ until a conflict becomes a civil war; that intervention is allowable at the invitation of an elected ‘democratic’ government to secure or restore its power; and that it is allowable in response to an invitation to counter ‘terrorist’ threats. The data shows that the Council does not unequivocally support the Nicaragua or IDI views but has approved regularly the anti-terrorist, and occasionally the pro-democracy, views. Its active voice is more marked than its alignment with any one theory. Among other implications, the IDI view – a Cold War response to abuses of supposed invitations – may be less salient when a multilateral check on such abuses is available.

If the intricacies of global supply chains form one crucial aspect of roadblock politics, we also need to investigate another aspect of logistics in order to unpack Congo’s roadblock proliferation. Focusing on Central African hinterlands where roads are a fading memory, Chapter 8 asks how contemporary rebel groups adapt to a terrain that is inimical to military logistics as usual. Rebels themselves have best theorized what military logistics might look like in the debris of infrastructural empire. By providing a glimpse of the inner workings of a few of Central Africa’s many rebel groups, this chapter explores what one armed group itself dubbed ‘non-conventional logistics’. From the perspective of conventional, centralized states, this form of organization is suboptimal, but it is perfectly geared to withdrawal from and rebuttal of the reach of outside powers. Yet the purchase of this approach extends beyond rebels: given the overbearing logistical and geographical constraints, state agents by necessity also practise versions of guerilla foraging, blurring the lines between enemies. Taken together, the examples provided in this chapter prompt one to consider political control not as a fixed property of mutually exclusive territorial configurations, but rather as a mobile and temporary achievement in the political economy of circulation.

While often presented as a diamond-infused ethnic conflict, Chapter 7 explores how the conflict in the Central African Republic has settled into a ‘war of roads’, where roadblocks figure as a key source of revenue and therefore of contestation between competing armed groups. For Central African rebels, control over one of these routes constitutes a key prize in the conflict -- exactly the same stakes that underpinned much of pre-colonial state formation in the region. Roadblocks, obligatory escorts, restrictions on who can participate in lucrative trade -- circulation is anything but free in the Central African Republic. Largely sharing the same practical limitations experienced by armed groups, the Central African government bears so many resemblances to armed groups that it vindicates Charles Tilly’s point that states can be likened to well-equipped mafia. While cattle-herders and traders who do business here have developed sophisticated strategies to evade all manner of armed actors, each of the parties to the conflict jealously keeps as tight a leash as possible on profitable long-distance exchange, lest the profits fall into the hands of competing Central African conflict entrepreneurs.

How do conflicts involving rebels that at first appear quite innocuous and small-scale, grow and aggravate? The chapter discusses the concept of the rebel and demonstrates that rebel groups, just like the state, can be seen as political and strategic actors. The rest of the chapter details the approach and the set-up of the study.

The introduction presents the puzzles which the book seeks to answer, introduces the literatures in political science and sociology which it strives to speaks to and contribute to, introduces the theoretical lenses it uses to unpack the cogs and wheels of the mechanisms at play in the Tawhid Islamist movement in Tripoli and discusses the methods on which research for this book has relied.

Chapter 6 investigates human rights, the rule of law, as well as participatory institutions. Democratic governance is possible, even if state capacities to enforce rules and decisions are weak or absent. We start by addressing the human rights problematique in areas of limited statehood. Strengthening state capacity might do human rights and the rule of law more harm than good, resulting in autocratic and repressive statehood. We explore the effectiveness of regional organizations (RO) and of (I)NGOs and non-state justice institutions to provide fair and transparent access to justice as a crucial component of the rule of law. They can accomplish these goals, the more their institutional design enables deliberative negotiations through fair and transparent procedures. The remainder of the chapter discusses the effectiveness of companies and rebel groups to engage in human rights and democratic governance. It is one thing to expect from companies to comply with human rights norms. It is quite different to ask them to promote human rights and the rule of law beyond their premises. Rebel groups are more likely to provide effective human rights and inclusive governance, particularly if they require international and domestic legitimacy and if they are faced with trust-based communities.

Chapter 5 deals with the provision of security in areas of limited statehood. We contest the notion that areas of limited statehood are mostly violent places where civil war prevails. We analyze peacekeeping missions, military interventions from the outside, as well as externally promoted security sector reform. We find that more limited external governance fostering inclusive post-conflict peace-building and security sector reform is more effective than comprehensive state-building efforts. We then look at the conditions under which violent non-state actors can provide public security in the territory that they control. Warlord governance tends to be rather ineffective. Rebel groups score better, particularly when they face high legitimacy needs and local communities with strong trust-based action capacity to hold them accountable. The chapter also looks at tribal groups and leaders as rather effective peace-keepers. They normally lack military enforcement capacity, but can rely on strong social norms to maintain security in communities. While “security under anarchy” is possible in areas of limited statehood, our findings cast serious doubts on whether public security governance can be sustainable in the long run, if a (state) monopoly of the use of force is not restored at some point.

The chapter begins by explaining the complementary role of criminal law in the application of international human rights. It then goes on to analyse the function of the concept of individual criminal responsibility under international law and its relationship to human rights violations. Subsequently, we examine the processes and mechanisms for enforcement of criminal rules under international law with an emphasis on policy rather than the procedural rules underpinning jurisdiction. The ‘peace versus justice’ debate, namely whether international prosecution should sometimes be side-lined in favour of negotiated solutions to ongoing conflicts, is an integral part of this discussion. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the two core mass international crimes, namely genocide and crimes against humanity with a view to demonstrating that their formulation is largely based on human rights (i.e. rights of victims), rather than criminal law, considerations.